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DILIGENCE AND BELATED APPEALS: ARK R. 
APP P.-CIV. 4(b)(3) IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
Johnathan D. Horton* 
I. INTRODUCTION
A series of Arkansas appellate decisions addresses a 
recurring issue—the entry of a final order without notice to one 
or more litigants.1  Appellate deadlines run from the date of entry 
of a final order, so the lack of notice typically results in the 
inability to perfect an appeal,2 as a party unaware of the entry of 
a final order is unlikely to timely perfect an appeal.3  This 
troublesome issue has arisen in Arkansas with sufficient 
frequency to merit a specific provision in the Arkansas Rules of 
Appellate Procedure—Civil.4  If a party can satisfy its 
requirements, Rule 4(b)(3) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate 
* Partner, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, and Adjunct Professor of Pretrial Procedure,
Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.  Thank you Nancy Bellhouse 
May and Gary D. Marts, Jr. for your helpful comments on drafts of this Article. (Any errors 
are, of course, my own.)  Thank you, Sarah Tisdale Horton, for encouraging me to pursue an 
idea and see it through to print. 
1. See Tissing v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. 166, at 4, 303 S.W.3d 446,
448; Kidwell v. Rhew, 371 Ark. 490, 491 n.1, 268 S.W.3d 309, 310 n.1 (2007); Francis v. 
Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 285, 294-95, 265 S.W.3d 117, 124 (2007); Sloan v. Ark. 
Rural Med. Prac. Loan & Scholarship Bd., 369 Ark. 442, 444, 255 S.W.3d 834, 836 (2007); 
Arkco Corp. v. Askew, 360 Ark. 222, 225, 200 S.W.3d 444, 446-47 (2004); Arnold v. 
Camden News Publ’g Co., 353 Ark. 522, 524-25, 110 S.W.3d 268, 269-70 (2003); see also 
Davis v. State, 2016 Ark. 47, at 3-4, 481 S.W.3d 764, 766-67; Anderson v. Holada, 2010 
Ark. App. 143, at 2, opinion after rebriefing, 2010 Ark. App. 425, at 1; River Valley Homes, 
Inc. v. Freeland-Kauffman & Fredeen, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 682, at 3, 5; Williams v. Blissard 
Mgmt. & Realty, Inc., No. CA-02-1339, 2003 WL 22053063, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 
2003). 
2. See, e.g., Sloan, 369 Ark. at 446, 255 S.W.3d at 838; Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 229,
200 S.W.3d at 449; Arnold, 353 Ark. at 528, 110 S.W.3d at 272. 
3. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(a); see also Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2. (noting that
timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional); see, e.g., Ellis v. Ark. State Highway 
Comm’n, 2010 Ark. 196, at 13, 363 S.W.3d 321, 328. 
4. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
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Procedure—Civil permits an attorney or litigant who did not 
receive notice of a judgment, decree, or order from which an 
appeal is sought to obtain an extension of time to file a belated 
notice of appeal.5  
Whether a party can make the required showing to obtain 
relief under Rule 4(b)(3), however, is another matter entirely.  
One precondition to obtaining relief under Rule 4(b)(3) is the 
requirement that the litigant or attorney demonstrate “diligence.”6  
The “diligence” requirement obligates a litigant or an attorney to 
monitor the status of his, her, or its case including knowing the 
contents of the court’s docket, and the documents filed.7  Before 
2006, Arkansas appellate courts interpreted Rule 4(b)(3) as 
implicitly requiring a party seeking a belated appeal to show 
“diligence” as a condition to obtaining relief.8  A 2006 
amendment made the diligence requirement explicit in the text of 
Rule 4(b)(3).9  Whether evaluating the explicit or implicit 
diligence requirement, Arkansas courts have frequently declined 
relief under Rule 4(b)(3),10 finding diligence lacking because 
either a litigant or his counsel failed to diligently monitor a case 
and, with diligence, would have timely learned of the entry of the 
final order or judgment.11  As a result, the vast majority of the 
reported cases in Arkansas deny relief sought under Rule 
4(b)(3).12 
Despite a specific rule addressing extending the time for 
appeal when the final order was entered without notice to one or 
more litigants and a line of cases addressing the issue, there has 
been a dearth of scholarship on Rule 4(b)(3).  This Article intends 
to fill that void by examining the issues precipitated by the entry 
5. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
6. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
7. See, e.g., Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 228, 200 S.W.3d at 448; Arnold, 353 Ark. at 528,
110 S.W.3d at 272. 
8. See ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3); see, e.g., Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 228, 200 S.W.3d
at 448; see also, cases cited supra note 1. 
9. See ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note, 2006 amendment (codifying
the diligence requirement for parties seeking to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal). 
10. See cases cited, supra note 1. But see infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
11. See Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 229, 200 S.W.3d at 449; Arnold, 353 Ark. at 528, 110
S.W.3d at 272. 
12. See cases cited, supra note 1 (collecting cases where relief is denied).  But see infra
notes 113-19 and accompanying text for the sole exception. 
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of a judgment without notice to a party.13  Since the principal 
complication resulting from the lack of notice of the order is the 
loss of the right to an appeal, Part II summarizes Arkansas civil 
practice to discuss the entry of final judgments by Arkansas courts 
emphasizing some points where their practices differ from 
practice before federal courts.14  Part III then examines the 
elements necessary to obtain relief under Rule 4(b)(3).15  Part IV 
traces the evolution of Rule 4(b)(3) from a provision originally 
omitted from Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate 
Procedure—Civil to its current formulation by exploring 
significant decisions and amendments to the Rules.16  This Article 
concludes with a critique of potential solutions to this reoccurring 
problem.17 
II. ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE
Although the procedural rules effective in Arkansas are 
generally taken from their federal counterparts, Arkansas civil 
practice for entry of orders departs from federal practice in certain 
material respects.  This Article examines civil practice for entry 
of orders in Arkansas state courts with a focus on those 
differences. 
Any discussion of the entry of orders in Arkansas must begin 
with the circuit clerk’s recordkeeping responsibilities.18  The 
13. Such orders are colloquially referred to as “stealth orders” because they are entered
without notice to the parties. 
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. Until the adoption of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution in 2000,
Arkansas courts were divided into circuit, chancery and probate courts.  See generally John 
J. Watkins, The Right to Trial by Jury in Arkansas After Merger of Law and Equity, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 649 (2002) (discussing prior structure and implications of
Amendment 80).  Each had jurisdiction over certain civil actions with the circuit court
generally responsible for actions at law, the chancery court responsible for actions lying in
equity, and the probate court responsible for probate and family law matters.  See id.  In
2000, the adoption of amendment 80, however, unified the structure of Arkansas courts,
rendering the circuit court as the trial court of general jurisdiction over actions at law or in
equity.  Id.  Despite the merger, the county clerk may serve as the ex-officio clerk of the
probate division, if the division exists.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-14-502(a)(2)(B) (2001).
Because this article focuses on civil practice post-Amendment 80, which lies in the circuit
720 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:4 
circuit clerk has two primary recordkeeping responsibilities.  
First, the circuit clerk must maintain a “civil docket.”19  The clerk 
is to note on the docket all papers filed with the clerk in 
chronological order including, process issued, returns of process, 
appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments, and is to file a copy 
of the papers in the folio with a mark of the file number.20  
Second, the circuit clerk must maintain a judgment record book.21  
In the judgment record book, the clerk maintains correct copies 
of every final judgment or appealable order, as well as copies of 
any order that affects “title to or lien on real or personal property,” 
or any other orders that the circuit court orders kept.22  
Considering these recordkeeping responsibilities, we turn to 
Arkansas practice for entry of judgments, orders, and decrees in 
civil cases.  
Rule 58 determines when a judgment23 or decree is 
effective.24  Under Rule 58, a judgment or decree is effective only 
when two factors are met: first, the separate document 
requirement is satisfied, and second, the document is “entered.”25  
As to the first factor, Arkansas follows the separate document 
requirement for judgments or decrees.26  Just as its name implies, 
this principle requires that a judgment or decree “be set forth on 
a separate document.”27  The purpose of this Rule is to simplify 
the process and make certain when a judgment becomes effective 
court, any discussion of the duties remaining with the county clerk is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  
19. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(a).
20. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(a). “In counties where the county clerk serves
as the ex officio clerk of any division of the circuit court, the filing” of the document with 
either the circuit or county clerk satisfies any filing requirement for a “pleading, paper, order, 
judgment, decree, or notice of appeal.”  Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(a) (emphasis 
added). 
21. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(1).
22. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(1).
23. A “[j]udgment . . . includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.”
ARK. R. CIV. P. 54(a). Although Rule 58 continues to use “decree,” a term traditionally used 
in chancery cases, Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution and the resulting merger of 
courts of law and equity eliminates the need to preserve this distinction.  2 DAVID NEWBERN 
ET AL., ARK. PRAC. SERIES CIVIL PRACTICE & PROC. § 31: 1, at 653 n.16 (5th ed. 2010) 
(citing 10 C. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 2651 (1998)). 
24. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
25. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
26. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
27. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
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for purposes of an appeal.28  As to the second factor, Rule 58 
provides that a judgment or decree is effective only when “entered 
as provided in Administrative Order No. 2.”29 Administrative 
Order No. 2 defines “entry” for purposes of determining when a 
judgment, decree or order is “entered.”30  Administrative Order 
No. 2 notes that “[t]he clerk shall denote the date and time that a 
judgment, decree or order is filed by stamping or otherwise 
marking it with the date and time and the word ‘filed.’”31  
Administrative Order No. 2(b)(2) provides that “[a] judgment, 
decree or order is entered when so stamped or marked by the 
clerk, irrespective of when it is recorded in the judgment record 
book.”32  “Entry,” for purposes of Administrative Order No. 2, 
means the date and time when the clerk33 stamps the document 
“filed.”34   
28. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978); United States v.
Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 220 (1973). 
29. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58. The previous version of Rule 58 referred to Rule 79(a), which
was abolished in 1987 with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s adoption of Administrative Order 
No. 2.  In re Changes to the Ark. R. Civ. P., 294 Ark. 664, 669, 742 S.W.2d 551, 554 (1987); 
see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 addition to reporter’s note to 1990 amendment.  Rule 79(a) 
previously provided: “[a]ll papers filed with the clerk, all process issued and returns thereon, 
all appearances, orders, verdicts and judgments shall be noted chronologically in the dockets 
and filed in the folio assigned to the action and shall be marked with its file number.”  ARK. 
R. CIV. P. 79(a) (superseded 1987).  It continued: “[t]hese entries shall be brief, but shall
[sic] show the nature of each paper filed or writ issued and the substance of each order or 
judgment of the court and of the returns showing execution of process.”  ARK. R. CIV. P. 
79(a) (superseded 1987).  It then provided: “[t]he entry of an order or judgment shall show 
the date the entry is made.”  ARK. R. CIV. P. 79(a) (superseded 1987).  In 1990, Rule 58 was 
amended to replace the reference to the abolished Rule 79(a) with the current reference to 
Administrative Order No. 2.  ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 addition to reporter’s note to 1990 
amendment. 
30. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2); see also Sunbelt Couriers v. McCartney,
303 Ark. 522, 523, 798 S.W.2d 92, 93 (1990) (“‘Entry’ occurs when a judgment or order is 
filed with the clerk of the court.”).  Significantly, paragraphs (2) to (4) of subdivision (b) of 
Administrative Order No. 2 were added in 1999.  In re Admin. Order No. 2, 338 Ark. 812, 
812-13 (1999); see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment
31. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2).
32. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2).
33. Administrative Order No. 2 defines the term “clerk” as referring to the Clerks of
the various Arkansas Circuit Courts, but also includes the county clerk to the limited extent 
that the law requires probate matters to be filed in the office of the county clerk. Ark. Sup. 
Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(f). 
34. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2); see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 reporter’s note
to Rule 58 (“This rule provides that a judgment or decree shall not be effective unless and 
until it is entered pursuant to Rule 79(a).  Thus for appeal purposes, the date of entry or filing 
of the judgment or decree is the effective date, as opposed to the date of rendition.”) (citations 
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Arkansas permits the filing of a judgment, order, or decree 
by facsimile.35  A fax filing raises similar issues for determining 
the time of “entry.”  If the clerk’s office has a fax machine, at the 
direction of the court, the clerk is to accept the fax transmission 
of a judgment, decree, or order for filing.36  The clerk is to mark 
the faxed copy “filed” on the date and time it is received on the 
clerk’s fax machine during the office’s regular business hours or, 
if received outside the clerk’s regular business hours, at the time 
the office opens on the next business day.37  While the date 
stamped on the faxed copy controls all appellate deadlines, the 
Rule requires that the original judgment, decree, or order be 
substituted for the faxed copy within fourteen days of 
transmission.38  
Alternatively, if the clerk’s office is not open for business, 
the court may make an order immediately effective by expressly 
finding extraordinary circumstances exist, signing the order, 
noting the time and date on the order, and marking or stamping 
the order “filed in open court.”39  An order issued to be 
immediately effective must be filed with the clerk the next day 
that the clerk’s office is open, and the filing date controls all 
appellate deadlines.40  While parties have argued an order was 
“entered” based on its filing with the judge,41 Arkansas appellate 
courts have rejected this argument and held merely having the 
omitted).  Accordingly, under Administrative Order No. 2, the current practice is 
substantially the same as prior practice under the now-abolished Rule 79(a).  See In re 
Changes to the Ark. Rules of Civ. Proc., 294 Ark. 664, 669, 742 S.W.2d 551, 554 (1987); 
see also Exigence, LLC v. Baylark, 2010 Ark. 306, at 12-13, 367 S.W.3d 550, 556-57 
(reversing discovery sanctions where order setting deadline for production was not entered 
until after the deadline established in the order, making timely compliance impossible). 
35. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(3).
36. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(3).
37. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(3).  This practice also applies where a judge
permits pleadings to be filed with him or her by facsimile.  ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(d); see generally 
NEWBERN ET AL., supra note 23, § 11:17. 
38. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(3); see also Francis v. Protective Life Ins.
Co., 371 Ark. 285, 291, 265 S.W.3d 117, 122 (2007). 
39. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(4).
40. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(4).
41. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(d). Interestingly, the cases do not discuss the apparent
limitation in Rule 5(d) that would permit a judge to file only “papers or pleadings.” ARK. R. 
CIV. P. 5(d).  This omission may result from the expansive definition of “papers” to include
“all pleadings, papers and other documents generated in the lawsuit.”  ARK. R. CIV. P. 5
additions to reporter’s note to 1985 amendment (internal quotations omitted).
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order signed by the judge with the recitation “filed with the judge” 
or similar words to that effect is insufficient to constitute entry of 
the order.42 
Arkansas practice for determining the time of entry of a 
judgment, decree, or order varies from federal practice.  The 
recordkeeping requirements of the clerk of a federal district court 
are substantially the same as those imposed on Arkansas circuit 
clerks.43  Federal district clerks, however, have significantly more 
responsibility for entering judgments than their state court 
counterparts.  Unless the district court orders otherwise, federal 
clerks are responsible for preparing, signing, and entering 
judgment without the court’s direction when the jury returns a 
general verdict, the court awards costs or a sum certain, or the 
court denies all relief.44  Similarly, the clerk is responsible for 
promptly entering judgment, the form of which is approved by the 
court, when a jury returns a special verdict or a general verdict on 
interrogatories, or when the court grants other relief.45  Federal 
clerks may also enter default judgments,46 although the general 
practice of most federal district court judges in Arkansas is to rule 
on motions for default judgment themselves or refer such motions 
to a magistrate judge.47  
As to the entry of judgment, federal practice also follows the 
separate document requirement.48  In federal practice, however, 
“entry” generally refers to the clerk’s notation of the judgment on 
the court’s civil docket.49  The “entry” on the civil docket is the 
42. See, e.g., Voyles v. Voyles, 311 Ark. 186, 187, 842 S.W.2d 21, 22 (1992) (per
curiam); Sullivan v. Wickliffe, 284 Ark. 33, 34, 678 S.W.2d 771, 771 (1984) (per curiam). 
43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 79.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(1).  Such a judgment is, however, subject to the provisions
of Rule 54(b) for certification of issues for an immediate appeal where there are multiple 
claims or parties.  FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(1). 
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(2).  As previously noted, such a judgment is, however, subject
to the provisions of Rule 54(b) for certification of issues for an immediate appeal where there 
are multiple claims or parties.  FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(2). 
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1).
47. See Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Arkansas, Rule 72.1(VIII)(A)(6) (permitting a district judge to designate a 
magistrate judge to conduct hearings and to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on “motions to dismiss an action and to review default judgment”).  
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(2).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 79(a); 12 JOSEPH T. MCLAUGHLIN,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: CIVIL § 58.03 (3d ed. 2013); 12 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET 
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seminal event.50  If no separate document is required, a judgment 
is “entered” in federal court when the clerk enters it on the civil 
docket.51  If a separate document is required, the federal rules 
provide that a judgment is entered when the judgment is entered 
in the civil docket and the earlier of two events occurs: either the 
judgment is set out in a separate document, or 150 days expires 
from its entry in the civil docket.52  In order to make an “entry,” 
federal procedure requires the clerk to create an entry on the civil 
docket so as to avoid any potential confusion of the timing of the 
entry that might result from a judgment being filed with the judge, 
rather than with the clerk.53  After a judgment is entered, federal 
district clerks may further tax costs to a prevailing party.54   
Beyond the mechanics of entry, Rule 58 of the Arkansas 
Rules of Civil Procedure also discusses the preparation of the 
judgment, decree, or order.55  Subject to the procedures of Rule 
54(b) for certifying issues for immediate appeal,56 when the 
circuit court decides to grant or deny the relief sought, or the jury 
enters a special or general verdict, the circuit court may direct the 
prevailing party to “promptly prepare and submit, for approval by 
the court and opposing counsel, a form of judgment or decree 
which shall then be entered as the judgment or decree of the 
court.”57  Alternatively, the circuit court may prepare and enter its 
own form of judgment or decree, or simply enter the precedent 
prepared by the prevailing party without the consent of opposing 
counsel.58  So, consistent with traditional Arkansas practice, Rule 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3103 (3d ed. 2014); 11 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2786 (3d ed. 2013). 
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c).
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(1).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(2).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(2)(B).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) (“The clerk may tax costs on 14 days’ notice.”).  While
Rule 54(d)(1) suggests the clerk should tax costs, with the clerk’s decision reviewed by the 
Court “[o]n motion served within the next 7 days,” Arkansas federal courts have generally 
continued to tax costs on application, too.  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1); see ARK. R. CIV. P. 
54(d)(2). 
55. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
56. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58; see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
57. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
58. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58.
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58 permits a circuit court to delegate the preparation of the 
precedent to counsel for a party.59  
In civil practice, the delegation of preparing the precedent 
prevails.  Arkansas courts have traditionally ordered counsel for 
the prevailing party to prepare the form of judgment or decree.60 
In this respect, the requirements of Rule 58 exist separate and 
apart from ethical obligations of counsel.61  The delegation 
permitted by Rule 58 implicitly includes the right of opposing 
counsel to have an opportunity to approve the form of the 
judgment or decree.62  The Reporter’s Notes to Rule 77 note that 
this practice of delegation in Arkansas civil cases justified the 
omission of the requirement that the circuit clerk serve notice of 
judgment from Rule 77 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil 
Procedure.63  The Reporter’s Notes to Rule 77 observed a 
provision similar to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules was 
unnecessary in light of Arkansas’ practice, stating “[s]ince the 
clerk does not prepare the judgment, there does not appear to be 
any necessity for the clerk to serve notice that a judgment has 
been entered.” 64  The Reporter’s Notes continue: “[t]his is 
59. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58; see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 reporter’s notes to Rule 58; see
generally, Walter Cox & David Newbern, The New Civil Procedure: The Court that Came 
in from the Code, 33 ARK. L. REV. 1, 72-73 (1979) (observing differences in federal and 
state practice and discussing criticisms of delegation).   
60. See, e.g., Barnett v. Howard, 363 Ark. 140, 144, 211 S.W.3d 494, 497 (2005)
(noting “it is customary for trial judges to rely upon the members of the bar to prepare 
judgments, orders and decrees in accordance with the court’s instructions.”); Farmers Ins. 
Co. v. Snowden, 366 Ark. 138, 144-45, 233 S.W.3d 664, 668 (2006) (stating “[t]he simple 
fact that one party’s prepared precedent was used does not suggest that the court did not 
exercise its independent judgment.”). 
61. The submission of proposed orders may implicate ethical concerns including,
without limitation, concerns about ex parte communications and candor toward the tribunal. 
See, e.g., ARK. R. PROF’L COND. 3.3, ARK. R. PROF’L COND. 3.5(b).  A detailed examination 
of the ethical obligations related to the entry of orders is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article.  
62. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 reporter’s notes to Rule 58; see also Jones-Blair Co. v.
Hammett, 51 Ark. App. 112, 116-17, 911 S.W.2d 263, 265-66 (1995) (en banc), rev’d on 
other grounds, 326 Ark. 74, 930 S.W.2d 335 (1996). 
63. Compare ARK. R. CIV. P. 77 reporter’s notes to Rule 77 with  FED. R. CIV. P.
77(d)(1) (“Immediately after entering an order or judgment, the clerk must serve notice of 
the entry, as provided in Rule 5(b), on each party who is not in default for failing to appear.”).  
However, the lack of notice of the entry does not affect the time for an appeal or the authority 
of the court to relieve a party for failing to appeal within the allowed time, except as allowed 
by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).  ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 reporter’s notes to Rule 58; FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). 
64. ARK. R. CIV. P. 77 reporter’s notes to Rule 77.
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particularly true since counsel normally prepares the judgment 
and opposing counsel is afforded an opportunity to approve 
same.”65  
Permitting the court to delegate the preparation of an order 
or judgment to counsel for a party is a significant departure from 
federal practice.66  Federal courts have expressed concern that the 
wholesale adoption of a party’s proposed findings, conclusions, 
or proposed order abandons the judicial function.67  
Commentators criticized the practice in federal court because it 
delays resolution of the action, and a party may overreach in 
preparing the judgment or poorly craft the document.68  Reported 
Arkansas cases suggest these criticisms are not without merit.69  
However, state courts have generally defended the practice for 
three reasons: first, a relative lack of judicial resources including, 
for most state courts in Arkansas, a lack of law clerks,70 second, 
the heavier caseload of state trial courts when compared to their 
65. ARK. R. CIV. P. 77 reporter’s notes to Rule 77.
66. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 reporter’s notes to Rule 58; accord FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b);
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 2786. 
67. See United States v. El Paso Nat’l Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964); see also In
re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 319 (3d Cir. 2005); Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 
380 F.3d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 2004). 
68. 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 2786; FED. R. CIV. P. 58 advisory committee’s
note to 2002 amendment. 
69. See, e.g., Ouachita Trek & Dev. Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 460, 462-63, 17
S.W.3d 491, 493-95 (2000) (addressing language in judgment differing from trial judge’s 
letter opinion); Davis v. Davis, 291 Ark. 473, 474, 725 S.W.2d 845, 845-46 (1987) (noting 
precedent submitted awarded damages of $24,761.14, almost twice the $12,836.14 awarded 
by the court); Carver v. Carver, 93 Ark. App. 129, 131-32, 217 S.W.3d 185, 187 (2005) 
(addressing divorce decree that mistakenly omitted property settlement provision dividing a 
retirement account). 
70. At the time of this writing the vast majority of circuit court judges in Arkansas do
not have the assistance of law clerks.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1410 (1989) 
(detailing appointment of law clerks in Sixth Judicial Circuit, but Chapter 13 omits any 
reference to law clerks in any other circuit).  While I am aware some other judicial circuits 
may have law clerks, the reality is law clerks at the trial court level in Arkansas are far from 
common. 
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federal counterparts,71 and third, the traditional use of this 
practice in civil cases without complications.72 
Contrary to the practice in federal courts,73 Arkansas does 
not require that the clerk serve a copy of a judgment, order, or 
decree on the parties to an action not in default, or require service 
of a copy by a party.74  In this respect, the Arkansas practice is a 
significant departure not only from practice in federal courts, but 
also from the practice in most jurisdictions.75  Most other 
jurisdictions require the service of notice of entry or a copy of the 
judgment, order, or decree on the parties not in default, by 
someone—the clerk,76 the court or court personnel,77 or a party or 
71. The available statistics still lend support to the proposition that, statistically
speaking, state trial courts have significantly heavier civil caseloads than their federal 
counterparts.  Statewide, for civil cases in calendar year 2018 in Arkansas state courts, the 
courts reported 46,199 civil filings and 42,881 dispositions.  ARK. JUDICIARY, 2019 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 27, https://perma.cc/N8WD-
QXMQ.  Statistics from the Administrative Office of the Courts show that for the Eastern 
and Western Districts of Arkansas for the 12-month period ending December 31, 2018, there 
were 2,429 cases pending on December 31, 2017, 2,818 cases commenced, 2,989 cases 
terminated, and 2,258 cases pending as of December 31, 2018.  Statistical Tables for the 
Federal Judiciary, ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/W52T-
QMRL.  This disparity is, however, not unexpected given the general jurisdiction of state 
trial courts compared with the limited jurisdiction of federal district courts. 
72. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1).
74. See, e.g., Roberts v. United Water, Inc., 2007 WL 4415388, at *1-2 (Ark. Ct. App.
Dec. 19, 2007). 
75. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
76. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 77(d); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 73(d); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(1)(A);
CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 7-5; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. 77(d)(1); HAW. R. CIV. P. 77(d); IDAHO R. 
CIV. P. 2.3(b); IND. R. TRIAL P. 72(D); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.442(6); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
258 (2010); KY. R. CIV. P. 77.04(1); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art 1913(A) (2018); ME. R.
CIV. P. 77(d); MD. CIR. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-324(a); MASS. R. CIV. P. 77(d); MICH. ADMIN. R.
CT. 8.105(C); MISS. R. CIV. P. 77(d); MO. R. CIV. P. 74.03; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1301.01
(2018); OHIO R. CIV. P. 58(B); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.2(B) (2007); R.I. SUPER. CT. R.
77(d); S.C. R. CIV. P. 77(d); TENN. R. CIV. P. 58(2)-(3); TEX. R. CIV. P. 306(a)(3); W. VA.
R. CIV. P. 77(d); WYO. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1).  Some states have an electronic filing for some
or all of their courts.  See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 77(d); FLA. STAT. § 28.2405 (2012); IND. R.
TRIAL P. 86; MASS. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(2); N.H. SUPP. SUPER. CT. R. 13(e); N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-
005.2(C); S.D. SUP. CT. R. 13-12; TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(f)(1); UTAH R. CIV. P. 5(b)(3)(B); VA.
SUP. CT. R. 1:17(a); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 12, § 5(a) (2019); see generally David Schanker &
Timothy A. Guidas, E-Filing in State Appellate Courts: An Updated Appraisal, NAT’L 
CONF. OF APP. CT. CLERKS, Sept. 2014, https://perma.cc/7LDM-CRWT.
77. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 58(a) (requiring court to serve copy of judgment when party
not present for its signature); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 77(d) (Prothonotary to serve 
copies); FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.516(h)(1); MINN. R. CIV. P. 77.04; OR. REV. STAT. § 
18.078(1) (2005); PA. R. CIV. P. 236 (Prothonotary to serve copies). 
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counsel.78  Although the Arkansas Supreme Court’s committee 
on civil practice recommended adopting a requirement in the mid-
1980s similar to that of the federal courts, Arkansas clerks 
successfully opposed the proposal.79   
As the contrast in practices illustrates, federal practice places 
more responsibility on the clerk.  Neither the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure nor the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 
impose a duty on the court to provide litigants notice of entry of 
a judgment, decree, or order.80  Rule 77 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, however, requires that “[i]mmediately after 
entering an order or judgment, the clerk must serve notice of the 
entry, as provided in Rule 5(b), on each party who is not in default 
for failing to appear.”81  Alternatively, Rule 77(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to serve notice of entry 
in accordance with Rule 5(b).82  The implementation and 
proliferation of the federal courts’ case management and 
electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system has automated this task 
and, therefore, made it less prone to human error.  Yet, despite 
automation, errors have still occurred83 and, even in federal court, 
78. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(1)(B) (providing optional notice by parties); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 664.5 (2018) (requiring counsel for party proposing precedent to serve copy 
or clerk if prevailing party is not represented); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1302(a) (counsel 
to serve notice of default judgment); MONT. R. CIV. P. 77(d); NEV. R. CIV. P. 58(e)(1) (party 
selected by court); N.C. R. CIV. P. 58 (party designated by court or, if none, party preparing 
judgment); N.D. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(2); N.J. R. CT. 1:5-1(a); N.Y. CT. R. 202.5(a); UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 58A(g); WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 54(f); WIS. STAT. § 806.06(3) (2019).
79. NEWBERN ET AL., supra note 23, § 40:3 n. 23; see also Watkins, supra note 18, at
13 n. 23. 
80. See, e.g., Roberts v. United Water, Inc., 2007 WL 4415388, at *1-2 (Ark. Ct. App.
Dec. 19, 2007). 
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1).  The clerk must also record the service on the docket.
FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1). 
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1).  “Winning parties are encouraged to send their own notice
in order to lessen the chance that a judge will accept a claim of non-receipt in the face of 
evidence that notices were sent by both the clerk and the winning party.”  FED. R. APP. P. 4 
advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
83. See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 270-71, 290 (2012) (reversing and
remanding dismissal of habeas corpus case of convicted inmate who missed appellate 
deadline where attorneys abandoned representation of convicted inmate); Two-Way Media 
LLC v. AT&T, Inc., 782 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming refusal to extend 
time to appeal where notice of electronic filing’s description of order was incomplete); In re 
Worldcom, Inc., 708 F.3d 327, 340-42 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing to deny relief under similar 
federal rule to hold notice under Rule 77(d) is for parties’ convenience, parties are obliged 
to monitor docket for entry of order, where notice not received because party failed to update 
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parties may not rely entirely on notice from the clerk, as courts 
have held the parties have an obligation to monitor the docket to 
ascertain when an order is entered in a case.84 
Rule 5 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure does require 
service of “every pleading and every other paper, including all 
written communications with the court, filed subsequent to the 
complaint, except one which may be heard ex parte, . . . upon 
each of the parties, unless the court orders otherwise because of 
numerous parties.”85  Although it excepts parties in default for 
failing to appear from the service requirement,86 Rule 5 requires 
that every pleading, paper,87 or other document that must be 
served under Rule 5 on a party or his attorney contain a statement 
that a copy has been served in accordance with Rule 5, state “the 
date and method of service and, if by mail, the name and address 
of each person served.”88  Despite this statement, Arkansas courts 
do not appear to have interpreted Rule 5 as requiring service of a 
judgment on all other parties.  
In practice, the venue usually impacts the mechanics of entry 
of an order or judgment.  For example, if the county has 
implemented electronic filing, counsel may simply submit a 
proposed precedent electronically.  Upon entry, the order or 
judgment normally appears on the Court’s docket and is available 
to view.  Parties registered for electronic filing who appeared in 
the case generally then receive a courtesy notice advising them of 
the entry of the order or judgment on the docket.89  Similarly, if 
the venue has not adopted electronic filing, the geographic 
location of chambers may impact the entry of the order or 
judgment.  When a judge’s chambers are geographically near the 
CM/ECF profile with new email address); Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 79 F.3d 1211, 
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“If in a particular case the movant is at fault—if the movant 
negligently failed to notify the clerk of his change of address, for example—then the district 
court may, in its discretion, deny relief . . . .”).   
84. See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc., 708 F.3d at 341; Two-Way Media LLC, 782 F.3d at
1316. 
85. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(a) (emphasis added).
86. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(a).
87. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the broad definition of
“paper” in ARK. R. CIV. P. 5). 
88. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(e).
89. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 21(7)(c)(1).
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clerk’s office,90 the judge or chambers’ staff will often, as a 
courtesy to counsel, file a signed order or judgment and return a 
copy of the entered precedent to counsel.  Practitioners appreciate 
this courtesy as it minimizes delay and moves the case towards 
resolution.  However, when a judge is hearing cases in a venue 
other than where he or she maintains chambers, the judge may 
simply sign the order or judgment and return it to the attorney for 
filing.  As the judge may only hold court in the venue periodically, 
this practice usually permits counsel to obtain the entry of the 
judgment or order without delay.  Some judges’ chambers address 
the issue by simply declining to file any orders or judgments and 
returning all signed documents to counsel.  Perhaps, it could be 
more efficient for chambers or, perhaps, by returning the 
document to the proponent, it ensures parties, not in default, 
receive notice of the entry of the order or judgment.  In practice, 
suffice to say, the venue may significantly impact the mechanics 
of entry of an order or judgment.   
The omission of service of a judgment from the duties of the 
circuit court and the circuit clerk leaves a gap in the responsibility 
for providing notice to the parties when a circuit court acts.  A 
90. The State of Arkansas is divided into twenty-three judicial districts, although some
districts are subdivided based on geography.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-901 (1977) 
(First); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1001 (1977) (Second); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1101 
(1977) (Third); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1201 (1977) (Fourth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
1301 (1977) (Fifth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1401 (1977) (Sixth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
13-3101(b) (1999) (Seventh); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3201(a) (1997) (Eighth-North);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3201(b) (1997) (Eighth-South); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
1701(a) (1995) (Ninth-East); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1701(b) (1995) (Ninth-West); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-13-1801 (1977) (Tenth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1901(a) (1983)
(Eleventh-East); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-1901(b) (1983) (Eleventh-West); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-13-2001 (1995) (Twelfth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2101 (1983) (Thirteenth);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2201 (1977) (Fourteenth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2301 (1977)
(Fifteenth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2401 (1977) (Sixteenth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
2501(a) (1999) (Seventeenth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2601(a) (1977) (Eighteenth-East);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2601(b) (1977) (Eighteenth-West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
2701 (1977) (Nineteenth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3001(a) (1997) (Nineteenth-East);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-3001(b) (1997) (Nineteenth-West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
2801 (1977) (Twentieth); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2901 (1995) (Twenty-first); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-13-3101(a) (1999) (Twenty-second); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2501(b) (1999)
(Twenty-third).  As a result, some judges have their chambers near the circuit clerk’s office.
For example, in Pulaski County, the clerk’s office is located on the first floor of the Pulaski
County Courthouse, while many of the circuit judges have chambers in the courthouse.  Most
circuit judges, however, still “ride the circuit” and routinely hear cases in locations where
they do not maintain chambers.
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common example illustrates this failure.  If a circuit court sitting 
in a venue that has not yet adopted electronic filing orally ruled 
on a summary judgment motion at a hearing and delegated 
preparation of the order to the attorney for the prevailing party, 
notice could depend on how the order was entered.  If the attorney 
for the prevailing party returned to his office, prepared the 
precedent, and submitted the proposed precedent to the circuit 
court, Rule 5(a) would require the party to provide notice to the 
parties by serving his letter to the circuit court and a copy of the 
proposed order on all parties, as a “paper.”91  However, if upon 
receipt of the precedent the circuit court signed the judgment, 
walked across the hall to the clerk’s office, and filed it, the Rules 
do not require service of the judgment by either the court or the 
clerk.92  Yet Rule 5(a) likely requires notice if, instead of filing 
the judgment, the circuit court signed the judgment, placed the 
signed judgment in an envelope, and returned the judgment to 
counsel by mail for filing.93  Rule 5 on its terms appears to require 
the prevailing party to serve a copy of the judgment, now signed, 
on his opponent when the judgment is filed.94  
The lack of notice becomes problematic because the date of 
entry of an order is a significant jurisdictional milestone under 
Arkansas law.  Arkansas measures the time period within which 
an appeal may be perfected from the date of entry of the judgment, 
decree, or order from which an appeal is taken.95  Ordinarily, to 
appeal a judgment, decree, or order, Arkansas appellate courts 
require the filing of a notice of appeal within thirty days of the 
entry of the judgment, decree, or order from which an appeal is 
91. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(a); see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 5, additions to reporter’s note to 1985
amendment (noting that precedent for judgment prepared at Court’s direction would have to 
be served in compliance with Rule 5). 
92. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5, additions to reporter’s note to 1985 amendment  (noting that
precedent for judgment prepared by counsel at Court’s direction would have to be served in 
compliance with Rule 5); see also River Valley Homes, Inc. v. Freeland-Kauffman & 
Fredeen, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 682, at 5. 
93. The implications for ethical considerations about ex parte communications are
beyond the intended scope of this article.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  But 
see Fitzhugh v. Comm. on Prof’l. Conduct, 308 Ark. 313, 318, 823 S.W.2d 896, 899 (1992) 
(affirming discipline for violation of ARK. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.3(d) and 3.5 where attorney 
failure to disclose material facts to special judge when submitting proposed precedent).  
94. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(a).
95. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(a).
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taken.96  One can conceive numerous scenarios that result in the 
entry of an order without notice to the parties.97  Recognizing that 
mistakes can and will occur, this Article does not attempt to 
explore all of the various acts that might result in the entry of an 
order without notice.  When a litigant fails to receive notice of 
entry of a judgment, decree, or order in time to timely perfect an 
appeal, Rule 4(b)(3) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate 
Procedure—Civil purports to provide relief, so this Article will 
next explore the terms of that rule. 
III. RELIEF UNDER RULE 4(B)(3) GENERALLY
The current version of Rule 4(b)(3) presently states, in 
pertinent part:  
Upon a showing of failure to receive notice of the judgment, 
decree or order from which appeal is sought, a showing of 
diligence by counsel, and a determination that no party 
would be prejudiced, the circuit court shall, upon motion 
filed within 180 days of entry of the judgment, decree, or 
order, extend the time for filing the notice of appeal for a 
period of fourteen (14) days from the day of entry of the 
extension order.  Notice of any such motion shall be given to 
all other parties in accordance with Rule 5 of the Arkansas 
Rules of Civil Procedure.98  
Accordingly, a party seeking relief under the current version 
of Rule 4(b)(3) must establish five prerequisites to relief: (A) a 
failure to receive notice of the judgment, decree, or order from 
which it seeks to appeal, (B) timeliness of its motion, (C) that it 
provided notice of the motion to all other parties, (D) diligence by 
counsel, and (E) lack of prejudice.99  If the circuit court finds these 
elements satisfied, it must enter an order permitting the belated 
96. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(a).  Similarly, a notice of cross appeal must “be filed within
ten (10) days after receipt of a notice of appeal,” but in no event, “shall a cross-appellant 
have less than thirty (30) days from the entry of the judgment, decree or order within which 
to file a notice of cross-appeal.” ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(a). 
97. The cases arising under Rule 4(b)(3) offer numerous examples where one or both
parties failed to receive notice of entry of an order or judgment.  See supra note 1 (collecting 
cases). 
98. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
99. See ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
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notice of appeal.100  The movant then has fourteen days during 
which to file a belated notice of appeal.101  Rule 4(b)(3) does not 
permit other extensions.102 The remainder of this Part will review 
each of the elements necessary for relief under Rule 4(b)(3) 
generally. 
A. Lack of Notice
The first element, failure of notice, is straightforward.103  In 
the reported cases, the failure of notice has referred generally to a 
party’s lack of receipt of a judgment or final order in sufficient 
time of its entry to permit the timely filing of a notice of appeal.104  
Where a party’s counsel received a copy of the order not marked 
“filed” and a letter from the circuit court indicating the order was 
sent to the clerk for filing, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the party had notice such that Rule 4(b)(3) did not apply, so there 
was no error in denying a motion for belated appeal.105  Similarly, 
Arkansas courts have upheld denial of relief under Rule 4(b)(3) 
where a party failed to provide sufficient factual evidence of a 
lack of notice.106  Likewise, Arkansas courts have held Rule 
4(b)(3) will not support an extension on a basis other than lack of 
notice, such as “unavoidable casualty.”107  Rule 4(b)(3) as applied 
100. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3); ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3), additions to reporter’s
note to 2004 amendment (noting amendment replaced “may” with “shall” and thus 
“require[ed] the circuit court to extend the time under the circumstances described in this 
provision”); see also Arkco Corp. v. Askew, 360 Ark. 222, 228-29, 200 S.W.3d 444, 449 
(2004).  
101. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
102. See River Valley Homes, Inc. v. Freeland-Kauffman & Fredeen, Inc., 2010 Ark.
App. 682, at 4 (2010) (dismissing appeal where notice of appeal filed on 15th day after 
extension order under ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3)). 
103. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).
104. See, e.g., Arnold v. Camden News Publ’g Co., 353 Ark. 522, 525, 110 S.W.3d
268, 270 (2003); Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 225, 200 S.W.3d at 446-47. 
105. See Lawrence v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2003 WL 22853894, at *2 (Ark.
Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2003). The Court of Appeals found it significant the attorney did not contact 
the clerk’s office to check on the status of the order until February 11, 2003, so while the 
opinion was silent as to when the attorney received the letter and the unfiled copy of the 
signed order, presumably based on its discussion of a lack of diligence, counsel received the 
letter near the January 8, 2003 date.  Id. at *1. 
106. See, e.g., Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Philrite Dev., Inc., 30 Ark. App. 88, 91,
782 S.W.2d 595, 596 (1990). 
107. Brewer v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 97 Ark. App. 238-A, 245 S.W.3d
719, 721 (2006). 
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by Arkansas courts is, therefore, limited on its terms to 
circumstances where there was a lack of notice. 
B. Timeliness
The second element, timeliness, relates to the timing of the 
motion seeking a belated appeal.  Such a motion for extension 
must be filed within 180 days of entry of the judgment, decree, or 
order from which an appeal is sought, rather than an order 
granting the motion.108 Arkansas courts have been unforgiving 
when litigants have missed this deadline.109  While Rule 4(b)(3) 
expressly provides that “[e]xpiration of the 180-day 
period . . . does not limit the circuit court’s power to act pursuant 
to Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.”110  The 
2004 amendments to Rule 4(b)(3) made clear that the circuit court 
retains the power to act under Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of 
Civil Procedure when an extension of time is no longer 
possible.111  Because of the potential for relief, this Article will 
briefly examine the circumstances offered by Rule 60 and will 
discuss the existing cases arising under Rule 60 on the typical 
facts.  
Rule 60 has three parts, each of which could potentially offer 
some relief.  First, for limited purposes, Rule 60(a) permits a court 
to “modify or vacate a judgment, order or decree on motion of the 
court or any party, with prior notice to all parties, within ninety 
days of its having been filed with the clerk.”112  The prerequisites 
to relief under Rule 60(a) are “[t]o correct errors or mistakes or to 
prevent the miscarriage of justice[.]”113  Rule 60(a) is, however, 
108. See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. v. Jaynes, 343 Ark. 143, 149, 33 S.W.3d 161,
164 (2000). 
109. See, e.g., Reaves v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 336 Ark. 269, 270, 984
S.W.2d 447, 448 (1999) (per curiam) (applying earlier version of rule to reject motion to 
enlarge time after period of time in rule expired); Leavy v. Norris, 324 Ark. 346, 348-49, 
920 S.W.2d 842, 843 (1996); Oak Hill Manor v. Ark. Health Servs. Agency, 72 Ark. App. 
458, 461, 37 S.W.3d 681, 683 (2001). 
110. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3).  In 2004, this provision was added in response to a
contrary decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals.  See Barnett v. Monumental Gen. Ins. 
Co., 81 Ark. App. 23, 25, 97 S.W.3d 901, 902 (2003).  
111. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 2004 amendment.
112. ARK. R. CIV. P. 60(a).
113. ARK. R. CIV. P. 60(a).
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inapplicable to criminal proceedings.114  Rule 60(a) is also subject 
to the ninety-day limitation to act, which may be insurmountable 
in certain instances, such as where a party does not learn of entry 
of the order or judgment in that period, or where the circuit court 
does not rule within that period.115  Second, Rule 60(b) permits a 
court to “at any time, with prior notice to all parties, correct 
clerical mistakes in judgments, decrees, orders, or other parts of 
the records and errors therein arising from oversight or 
omission.”116  This provision embodies the common law rule of 
nunc pro tunc orders, applicable in criminal or civil cases, which 
permits courts to correct clerical errors in a judgment or order “to 
make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it 
did not speak but ought to have spoken.”117  Third, Rule 60(c) 
permits a circuit court to vacate or modify a judgment or order, 
other than a default judgment to which Rule 55(c) applies, after 
the expiration of ninety days of the filing of the judgment for 
seven specific reasons: (1) newly discovered evidence, (2) 
appearance of defendants constructively summoned, (3) 
“misprisions of the clerk,” (4) misrepresentation or fraud, 
intrinsic or extrinsic, by an adverse party, (5) “erroneous 
proceedings against an infant or person of unsound mind,” (6) 
death of one of the parties before judgment, and (7) errors in a 
judgment shown by a minor within a year of reaching the age of 
majority.118  Whether Rule 60 offers a ready path to relief, 
however, remains uncertain. 
The practical application of Rule 60 has shown that a path to 
relief is not readily apparent on the facts typically involved in a 
lack of notice case.  The cases have resolved some arguments 
under Rule 60 already.  For example, the reported decisions 
establish that entry of an order without notice to the parties is not 
a “clerical error” subject to correction at any time pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.119  Nor is relief 
114. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 374 Ark. 19, 25, 285 S.W.3d 614, 619 (2008).
115. See, e.g., Henson v. Wyatt, 373 Ark. 315, 317, 283 S.W.3d 593, 595 (2008) (per
curiam). 
116. ARK. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
117. See, e.g., Lord v. Mazzanati, 339 Ark. 25, 28-29, 2 S.W.3d 76, 78-79 (1999).
118. ARK. R. CIV. P. 60(c).
119. See Watson v. Connors, 372 Ark. 56, 56, 58, 270 S.W.3d 826, 827-28 (2008).
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available under Rule 60(c)(4) for misrepresentation or 
constructive fraud.120  Despite the implicit right of counsel to 
review and approve a precedent prepared by an opponent,121 the 
reported decisions have held submission of a proposed order 
without affording an opponent notice or an opportunity to 
comment is not the equivalent to misrepresentation or 
constructive fraud.122  Nor have Arkansas appellate courts 
permitted circuit courts to simply vacate an order or judgment 
only to re-enter it to permit a timely appeal.123  As a result, these 
circumstances will not support relief under Rule 60.  Whether the 
remaining circumstances might offer hope for relief would 
require litigation of each on its own specific facts.  As a result, 
this Article leaves that task for another day, and returns to the 
remaining elements necessary for relief under Rule 4(b)(3). 
C. Notice
The third element, notice to other parties, is easily satisfied 
by compliance with the service requirements of Rule 5.124  Rule 
5 requires “every pleading and every other paper, including all 
written communications with the court, filed subsequent to the 
complaint, except one which may be heard ex parte, shall be 
served upon each of the parties, unless the court orders otherwise 
because of numerous parties.”125  The Reporter’s Notes to Rule 5 
state: “[w]ith the obvious exception of ex parte proceedings, and 
conferring some discretion on the court in cases involving 
multiple parties, the Rule requires service of all pleadings, papers 
120. See Oak Hill Manor, LLC v. Ark. Health Servs. Agency, 72 Ark. App. 458, 462,
37 S.W.3d 681, 683 (2001); Barnett v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 81 Ark. App. 23, 24-25, 
97 S.W.3d 901, 902 (2003). 
121. ARK. R. CIV. P. 58 reporter’s notes to Rule 58 (stating “[i]mplicit in this rule is
the right of opposing counsel to be afforded an opportunity to approve the form of judgment 
or decree”). 
122. See Oak Hill Manor, 72 Ark. App. at 462, 37 S.W.3d at 683; Barnett, 81 Ark.
App. at 24-25, 97 S.W.3d. at 902. 
123. See, e.g., Combined Healthcare Fed. Credit Union v. Arands Corp., 2011 Ark.
App. 277, at 6, 378 S.W.3d 878, 881 (noting remedy is not to vacate under ARK. R. CIV. P. 
60 , but motion to extend time to file belated appeal under ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4(b)(3)).   
124. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(a).
125. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5(a) (emphasis added); see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (requiring,
with same language, attorney’s signature). 
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and other documents generated in the lawsuit on each of the 
parties to the action.”126  The cases generally have not involved 
any real discussion of this element, likely because it is so easily 
satisfied.127   
D. Diligence
As to the fourth element, diligence, “[t]he burden of 
diligence is on all parties to stay informed about the status of a 
case as a matter of Arkansas case law.”128  This requirement is 
extended to attorneys, who have a duty under Rule 1.3 of the 
Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct129 to “act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”130  
Arkansas courts have held that attorneys and litigants have a duty 
to monitor the trial court’s docket following submission of orders 
for entry,131 and that parties have a duty to know the contents of 
the court’s docket and what filings have or have not been made in 
their case.132  An attorney is not relieved of this duty even if the 
court fails to observe a mandatory obligation set forth in the Rules 
of Civil Procedure.133  Because of the heavy burden to show 
diligence, Arkansas appellate courts have upheld an extension 
under Rule 4(b)(3) granted to a litigant in only a few of the 
decisions.134   
126. ARK. R. CIV. P. 5 reporter’s notes (as modified by the court) to Rule 5.
127. See supra note 1 (collecting cases).
128. Arnold v. Camden News Publ’g Co., 353 Ark. 522, 525, 110 S.W.3d 268, 270
(2003).  Interestingly, four justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court did not participate in the 
appeal, and three special justices joined in the final opinion.  Id. at 528, S.W.3d at 272. 
129. ARK. R. PROF’L COND. 1.3.
130. ARK. R. PROF’L COND. 1.3; see also Arnold, 353 Ark. at 527-28, 110 S.W.3d at
271-72.
131. See, e.g., Arnold, 353 Ark. at 528, 110 S.W.3d at 272; Arkco Corp. v. Askew, 360
Ark. 222, 228, 200 S.W.3d 444, 448 (2004). 
132. See, e.g., Block v. State, 2011 Ark. 161, at 1.
133. Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 285, 295, 265 S.W.3d 117, 124
(2007). 
134. See, e.g., Kidwell v. Rhew, 371 Ark. 490, 492 n.1, 268 S.W.3d 309, 310 n.1
(2007); Anderson v. Holada, 2010 Ark. App. 143, at 2-3 opinion after rebriefing 2010 Ark. 
App. 426.  
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E. Prejudice
The final element, prejudice, contemplates an adverse 
consequence beyond having to litigate the appeal and encounter 
the risk of reversal.135  While the cases have found no prejudice 
to an extension, they offer little insight into what prejudice might 
look like other than what it is not—litigation of an appeal and the 
risk of reversal.  Apparently relying on the Reporter’s Note,136 at 
least one treatise suggests such prejudice might occur, where “the 
appellee had [acted] in reliance on the expiration of the normal 
time period for filing a notice of appeal.”137  This approach is 
consistent with the view of the federal courts applying a similar 
provision of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure—
Civil.138 
F. Conclusion
While the other four elements have proven straightforward 
to satisfy, the necessity of showing “diligence” has proven elusive 
for litigants seeking relief.  The reported cases make clear that the 
“diligence” requirement is the most difficult of the five elements 
to satisfy.139  Few reported Arkansas decisions reach the merits of 
a case following an extension under Rule 4(b)(3).140  Even in 
those cases that find an extension under Rule 4(b)(3) is 
appropriate, the courts offer little guidance on establishing 
“diligence” existed on the facts.141  Accordingly, the next Part 
focuses on the diligence requirement itself and its development 
under Arkansas law in hopes that the facts of the cases will offer 
practitioners guidance on the interpretation of Rule 4(b)(3). 
135. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
136. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
137. NEWBERN ET AL., supra note 23, § 40:4.
138. FED. R. APP. P. 4 advisory committee notes to 1991 Amendment; see generally
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 3950.5. 
139. See, e.g., Arnold v. Camden News Publ’g Co., 353 Ark. 522, 525, 110 S.W.3d
268, 272 (2003); Arkco Corp. v. Askew, 360 Ark. 222, 227, 200 S.W.3d 444, 448 (2004). 
140. See, e.g., Kidwell v. Rhew, 371 Ark. 490, 492 n.1, 268 S.W.3d 309, 310 n.1
(2007); Anderson v. Holada, 2010 Ark. App. 143, at 2-3 opinion after rebriefing 2010 Ark. 
App. 426.   
141. See, e.g., Kidwell, 371 Ark. at 492 n.1, 268 S.W.3d at 310 n.1; Anderson, 2010
Ark. App. at 2-3. 
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IV. RULE 4(B)(3) AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT 
The origin of the diligence requirement of Rule 4(b)(3) of 
the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure—Civil lies in both 
appellate decisions interpreting Rule 4(b)(3) and a series of 
revisions to the text of the Rule itself.  To examine the diligence 
requirement in context, this Part will detail certain background 
principles that underlie the Arkansas Supreme Court’s analysis 
and then will chronologically examine the history of Rule 4(b)(3) 
from the initial adoption of Rule 4 in 1979, through the current 
version of the Rule with an emphasis on cases applying its terms 
or modifications to the Rule itself.  
A. Background
Three principles of Arkansas law merit discussion.  Each 
impacts the opinions related to Rule 4(b)(3).  Each existed before 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted.   
First, under Arkansas law, the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, so a timely filed notice of appeal is 
necessary to perfect an appeal.142  This lack of jurisdiction is not 
subject to waiver, even by the opponent’s consent.143   
Second, as noted above,144 under Arkansas law, Arkansas 
courts have required litigants and attorneys alike to review the 
pleadings and remain informed about the status of their case on 
the court’s docket.145  
Finally, Rule 4(b)(3) did not create the diligence standard but 
incorporated the standard from decisions by Arkansas courts 
vacating or setting aside a judgment.  Before the adoption of the 
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Arkansas courts could vacate 
a judgment after expiration of the term during which the judgment 
was entered, but only on certain limited grounds.146  Arkansas had 
142. See, e.g., White v. Avery, 226 Ark. 951, 953, 295 S.W.2d 364, 365 (1956).
143. See, e.g., Smith v. Boone, 284 Ark. 183, 184, 680 S.W.2d 709, 710 (1984).
144. See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Karam v. Halk, 260 Ark. 36, 40, 537 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1976); Trumbull
v. Harris, 114 Ark. 493, 494, 170 S.W. 222, 223 (1914).
146. See, e.g., Davis v. McBride, 247 Ark. 895, 897, 448 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1969).
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by statute enumerated the limited grounds upon which a judgment 
might be set aside after expiration of the term at which the 
judgment was rendered.147  Among the grounds for setting aside 
a judgment after the term of its rendition was “unavoidable 
casualty or misfortune preventing the party from appearing or 
defending.”148  A party who sought relief from a judgment on the 
basis of unavoidable casualty had the burden of showing that he 
was diligent and without negligence.149  Applying this standard, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court has considered the entry of 
judgments without notice to an opponent and evaluated the 
diligence exercised by the party seeking relief.150  Such cases 
arose in a variety of contexts.  Where judgment was entered by 
default after the clerk lost the defendant’s answer, the defendant 
failed to appear at trial, and the defendant did not seek to vacate 
the judgment for eight months after entry of the default, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of the vacation 
request for a lack of due diligence.151  Where litigants were 
properly served with summons, and then contacted an attorney, 
but the attorney misunderstood his directions and did not raise a 
defense until after execution on the default judgment issued, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court found that the litigants “were negligent 
in their attention to the matter,” and not entitled to relief from the 
judgment.152  Similarly, where a party did not receive a copy of 
the precedent prepared by his opponent’s counsel, awarding more 
than the pled damages, until after execution issued, and that same 
opposing counsel had failed to provide an opportunity to review 
the precedent, communicate the submission of the precedent to 
the trial court, or serve a copy of the judgment, the Court found a 
147. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-506 (Repl. 1962) (repealed 1978).  Other methods to attack
such judgments existed including a bill of review in chancery court or errors of law apparent 
from the face of the record.  See, e.g., Davis, 247 Ark. at 897, 448 S.W.2d at 39.  These other 
methods are not, however, germane to our discussion of diligence and lie beyond the scope 
of this article. 
148. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-506 (Repl. 1962) (repealed 1978).
149. See Davis, 247 Ark. at 898, 448 S.W.2d at 39; Bickerstaff v. Harmonia Fire Ins.
Co., 199 Ark. 424, 133 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1939). 
150. Davis, 247 Ark. at 898, 448 S.W.2d at 39 (emphasis omitted); Bickerstaff, 199
Ark. at 428, 133 S.W.2d at 892 (quoting Trumbull, 114 Ark. at 497, 170 S.W. at 223).  See 
also Karam v. Halk, 260 Ark. 36, 40, 537 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1976). 
151. Bickerstaff, 199 Ark. at 428, 133 S.W.2d at 892.
152. Davis, 247 Ark. at 896-98, 448 S.W.2d at 38-39.
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lack of diligence prevented vacating the judgment based on 
unavoidable casualty.  The Court rejected an argument that fraud 
justified vacating the judgment, finding “no indication that fraud 
was practiced upon the court in the procurement of the 
judgment.”153  Although it cautioned litigants, stating that, while 
it found no abuse of discretion, it did “not approv[e] or 
encourag[e] the entry of a judgment on a precedent prepared by 
the prevailing party without the adverse party or parties having 
had an opportunity to see the proposed judgment and make 
objections to its form, content or language before entry.”154   
While these cases applied the law as it existed before the 
Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted, the Court 
continues to apply the diligence requirement in practice under 
Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.155   
B. Initial Adoption of Rule 4
Rule 4 was initially adopted with the remainder of the 
Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure—Civil, effective July 1, 
1979, which superseded prior law.156  Unlike its federal 
counterpart, which permits the district court to extend the time for 
filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect157 
or to belatedly reopen the time to file an appeal,158 the initial 
version of Rule 4 did not include a provision to belatedly extend 
the time for filing a notice of appeal.159  The Reporter’s Notes 
justified this omission stating such a provision was unnecessary 
because “Arkansas has long considered the filing of a notice of 
appeal as jurisdictional and unless timely filed, there can be no 
153. Karam, 260 Ark. at 42, 537 S.W.2d at 800 (emphasis omitted).
154. Id. at 39, 41-42, 537 S.W.2d at 798-800.  Significantly, the Court observed that
the failure to serve the proposed judgment did not violate the court rule requiring service of 
all pleadings on opposing counsel because “[a] precedent for judgment is not, in any sense 
of the word, a pleading.”  Id. at 39-40, 537 S.W.2d at 799.  
155. See, e.g., Harrill & Sutter, P.L.L.C. v. Kosin, 2012 Ark. 385, at 8, 424 S.W.3d
272, 277 (“Moreover, this court has stated that a party is not entitled to relief under Rule 
60(c) if diligence has not been exercised in protecting his or her interests.”). 
156. See, e.g., LaRue v. LaRue, 268 Ark. 86, 87, 593 S.W.2d 185, 186 (1980).
157. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5).
158. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6).
159. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 (repealed 1986).
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appeal.”160  Accordingly, the Court saw no point in including such 
a provision. 
C. 1986 Amendments
This omission was, however, short-lived.  Effective 
September 15, 1986, Rule 4(a) was amended to permit the trial 
court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal when a party 
did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order from 
which the party seeks to appeal.161  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
added the following text to the remainder of Rule 4(a): 
Upon a showing of failure to receive notice of entry of the 
judgment, decree or order from which appeal is sought, the 
trial court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal 
by any party for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days from 
the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by these 
rules.  Such an extension may be granted before or after the 
time otherwise prescribed by these rules has expired; but if a 
request for an extension is made after such time has expired, 
it shall be made by motion with such notice as the court shall 
deem appropriate.162 
So, the 1986 amendment created a narrow exception to the 
rule that filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and, absent a 
timely filed notice of appeal, no appeal lies.163  The Reporter’s 
Note observed the intent “to empower the trial court to extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal when the party has not received 
notice of the entry of the judgment or order from which he seeks 
to appeal.”164  It continued, discussing the purpose of the 
amendment, stating “[t]he change was deemed necessary to 
ensure fairness when counsel has not received notice of the entry 
of the judgment or other appealable order.”165  Then it candidly 
acknowledged the reality that, “[a]lthough under longstanding 
160. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 reporter’s notes (as revised by the court) to former
appellate Rule 4 (citing White v. Avery, 226 Ark. 951, 295 S.W.2d 364 (1956)). 
161. See In re Changes to the Ark. R. Civ. P., 289 Ark. 602, 612, 712 S.W.2d 296, 301
(1986); see also ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s notes to 1986 amendment. 
162. In re Changes to the Ark. R. Civ. P., 289 Ark. at 611-12, 712 S.W.2d at 301.
163. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s notes to 1986 amendment.
164. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s notes to 1986 amendment.
165. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s notes to 1986 amendment.
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Arkansas custom opposing counsel have been given an 
opportunity to approve a judgment or order prepared by opposing 
counsel, circumstances have arisen where counsel did not receive 
that opportunity and did not otherwise receive notice that a 
judgment had been entered.”166 
D. Significant Decisions Between 1986 and 1999
During this period, two appellate decisions merit 
discussion.167  On December 18, 1995, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court issued a brief per curiam opinion dismissing an appeal in 
Miller v. King.168  There, Paul G. Miller, a pro se plaintiff, had 
filed a complaint in equity against three defendants and each of 
the defendants filed a motion to dismiss.169  The circuit court 
granted each motion in three separate orders, the last of which 
was entered June 19, 1995, dismissing the complaint as to each 
defendant.170  On July 27, 1995, Miller filed an untimely notice 
of appeal.171  When he tendered the appellate record to the clerk, 
the clerk refused to accept it.172  Miller then filed a motion for rule 
on clerk, asserting the clerk should be required to accept the 
record because he did not receive adequate notice of the 
complaint’s dismissal.173  The Court denied the motion stating: 
“[i]t is clear that in a civil matter the plaintiff bears the 
responsibility of being aware of the proceedings and filing a 
timely notice of appeal if an adverse final ruling is entered.”174  
The court then stated: “[t]here is no provision for a belated appeal 
on the ground that the plaintiff was unaware that an order had 
been entered as is permitted in certain instances under Criminal 
Procedure Rule 36.9 in criminal cases.”175   
166. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s notes to 1986 amendment.
167. See Miller v. King, 322 Ark. 819, 912 S.W.2d 416 (1995); Chickasaw Chem. Co.
v. Beasley, 328 Ark. 472, 944 S.W.2d 511 (1997).
168. 3Miller, 322 Ark. at 819-20,819, 912 S.W.2d at 416-17 (1995).
169. Id. at 819, 912 S.W.2d at 416.
170. Id. at 819-20, 912 S.W.2d at 416.
171. Id. at 820, 912 S.W.2d at 416.
172. Id.
173. Miller, 322 Ark. at 820, 912 S.W.2d at 416-17.
174. Id. at 820, 912 S.W.2d at 417 (citing Karam v. Halk, 260 Ark. 36, 537 S.W.2d
797 (1976)). 
175. Miller, 322 Ark. at 820, 912 S.W.2d at 417.
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The Miller decision is interesting.  The Miller court’s 
suggestion that no provision permitting a belated appeal existed 
is inconsistent with the then-existing text of Rule 4(a), which 
permitted a belated appeal, if sought within sixty days.176  Of 
similar interest is the Miller Court’s acknowledgment of the 
differing treatment provided to criminal appeals.  Even now, that 
differing treatment remains, Rule 2 of the Arkansas Rules of 
Appellate Procedure—Criminal, which incorporates the relevant 
provisions of former Criminal Rule 36.9, provides for belated 
appeals.177  Rule 2 permits the Arkansas Supreme Court to act on 
a criminal case in which neither a notice of appeal was given nor 
the transcript timely filed, “when a good reason for the omission 
is shown by affidavit.”178  “[N]o motion for belated appeal shall 
be entertained . . . unless application has been made . . . within 
eighteen (18) months of the date of entry of judgment or entry of 
the order denying postconviction relief from which the appeal is 
taken.”179  Where the judgment of conviction is not entered of 
record within ten days of sentencing, the “application for belated 
appeal must be made within eighteen (18) months of the date 
sentence was pronounced.”180  The Court has, however, required 
the affidavit to support the motion before taking up the motion for 
belated appeal.181  When a party’s life or liberty is at stake, the 
circumstances seem to warrant additional latitude. 
The other decision of interest in this period is Chickasaw 
Chem. Co. v. Beasley.182  There, on May 5, 1997, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court granted Beasley’s motion to dismiss Chickasaw 
Chemical’s appeal.183  On September 6, 1996, the trial court had 
entered judgment for Beasley, and ten days later on September 
16, 1996, Chickasaw Chemical Company filed motions for a new 
176. In re Changes to the Ark. R. Civ. P., 289 Ark. 602, 612, 712 S.W.2d 296, 301
(1986). 
177. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 2(e).
178. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 2(e).
179. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 2(e).
180. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 2(e).
181. See, e.g., Slack v. State, 338 Ark. 643, 643, 999 S.W.2d 668, 668 (1999) (per
curiam). 
182. Chickasaw Chem. Co. v. Beasley, 328 Ark. 472, 944 S.W.2d 511 (1997) (per
curiam). 
183. Id. at 473-74, 944 S.W.2d at 511-12.
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trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.184  On 
September 30, 1996, in open court, the court denied its post-trial 
motions, and on October 2, 1996, Chickasaw Chemical Co. filed 
a notice of appeal.185  On October 8, 1996, the trial court entered 
an order denying its post-trial motions.186  On November 18, 
1996, Chickasaw Chemical Co. then filed a motion to extend the 
time to file an appeal, and on December 2, 1996, the trial court 
denied the motion.187  The next day, on December 3, 1996, 
Chickasaw Chemical Co. filed a second notice of appeal from the 
judgment, the order denying its post-trial motions, and the order 
denying the extension of time to file an appeal.188  Beasley sought 
dismissal of the appeal arguing that the first notice of appeal was 
premature and a nullity, while the second was invalid because 
Rule 4(a) only permits an extension of time where a party did not 
receive a notice of entry of the order from which an appeal was 
sought, and Beasley asserted it should have been aware of the 
order.189  The Court agreed, finding that Chickasaw Chemical 
should have been aware of the “deemed-denied” date for its post-
trial motions and the fact that a notice of appeal was due within 
thirty days of that date, or by November 15, 1996.190  Because no 
notice of appeal or motion for extension was filed by that date, 
the Court held the narrow exception in Rule 4(a) inapplicable, and 
dismissed the appeal.191   
Although in Chickasaw Chem. Co., the Court did not use the 
term “diligence,” its reasoning parallels the Court’s later analysis 
in some cases applying the diligence standard; in other words, 
with reasonable diligence, Chickasaw would have been aware 
that, absent entry of an order, its post-trial motions would be 
deemed denied after thirty days and a notice of appeal due thirty 
days later.192  Since it was not aware of the deemed-denial date 
and missed the appellate deadline applicable under the deemed-
184. Id. at 473, 944 S.W.2d at 512.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Chickasaw Chem. Co., 328 Ark. at 473, 944 S.W.2d at 512.




192. Chickasaw Chem. Co., 328 Ark. at 473, 944 S.W.2d at 512.
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denial date, it was not entitled to relief.193  Although not fully 
developed in the Chickasaw Chemical Co. opinion, the decision 
foreshadows the diligence requirement, even though it does not 
directly discuss the obligations imposed on a party or their 
counsel in terms of “diligence.”  
E. 1999 Amendments and Decisions
The Court revisited Rule 4 in amendments effective January 
28, 1999.194  The 1999 amendments deleted the provision 
addressing the situation in which a party did not receive notice of 
entry of a judgment, decree, or order from Rule 4(a), and 
relocated that language to its current location in Rule 4(b)(3).195  
Because it operated restrictively in practice, the 1999 amendment 
extended the time during which a party who did not receive notice 
of a judgment or order could seek an extension of the time to 
appeal.196  The amendment deleted the reference to seeking an 
extension from sixty days after the expiration of the appellate 
deadline and inserted the current language permitting an 
extension “upon motion filed within 180 days of the entry of the 
judgment, decree, or order.”197  After entry of the extension order, 
the appellant must file the notice of appeal within fourteen 
days.198 The amendment also requires the court to determine the 
extension did not prejudice another party.199  In making the 
determination of whether a party is “prejudiced,” the Reporter’s 
Note added that “‘prejudice’ means some adverse consequence 
other than the cost of having to oppose the appeal and encounter 
the risk of reversal.”200  As an example, it noted that “prejudice” 
might arise if the appellee had acted in reliance on the expiration 
of the normal time for perfecting an appeal.201   
193. Id.
194. See ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
195. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
196. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
197. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
198. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
199. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
200. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
201. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 1999 amendment.
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On the same day the amendments to Rule 4 went into effect, 
January 28, 1999, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Reaves v. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Ark.202  denying a motion 
for rule on the clerk as untimely based on an extension under Rule 
4(a).203  Reaves had filed suit against Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Arkansas, Inc. and Southern Farm Bureau 
Casualty Insurance Company.204  On February 17, 1998, the trial 
court entered an order granting the defendants’ summary 
judgment, with copies showing to have been sent to counsel for 
both parties.205  On July 16, 1998, Farm Bureau’s counsel wrote 
the trial court concerning the status of the summary judgment.206  
On August 28, 1998, Reaves sought an enlargement of the time 
of thirty days to file an appeal because she had not received a copy 
of the summary judgment order until July 27, 1998.207  On 
September 8, 1998, the trial court entered an order extending the 
time for an appeal until September 28, 1998.208  On September 
10, 1998, Reaves filed her notice of appeal.209  On December 10, 
1998, the Supreme Court Clerk refused the tender of the appellate 
record as untimely.210  Reaves filed a motion for rule on the 
clerk.211  
The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the motion.212  It held 
that a notice of appeal filed 205 days after the order for summary 
judgment was entered was well more than the thirty days for a 
timely appeal or the sixty days under what was then known as 
Rule 4(a).213  Citing Miller, it stated the appellant was responsible 
for staying abreast of the proceedings and timely filing a notice 
of appeal.214  Because the sixty day period in Rule 4(a) had 
202. Reaves v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 336 Ark. 269, 984 S.W.2d 447
(1999). 









212. Reaves, 336 Ark. at 270, 984 S.W.2d at 448.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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expired, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enlarge the time for 
appeal.215  In a footnote, the Court observed that even if it applied 
the newly amended rule, the motion to file a belated appeal was 
untimely, as Reaves’ motion to enlarge time was not filed within 
180 days of the summary judgment order.216   
In the following year, the Arkansas Supreme Court again 
addressed the timeliness of a motion to extend the time to file a 
belated appeal.217  In General Accident Insurance Co. v. Jaynes, 
the Court found that the 180 day limit in Rule 4(b)(3) applied to 
the filing of the motion for an extension of the time to file a notice 
of appeal, not the trial court’s order granting the motion.218  The 
Court upheld as timely extension motions by the intervenor 
insurer who asserted it had no notice of the orders approving a 
settlement after it had intervened in the wrongful death action and 
related probate case to claim a statutory worker’s compensation 
subrogation lien on the settlement recovery by the decedent’s 
estate, specifically where the extension motion in the civil case 
was filed 173 days after an order approving the settlement 
contingent on its approval by the probate court, and the extension 
motion in the probate case was filed eighty-five days after the 
order approving the settlement in the probate case.219  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s granting of the 
motion, and denied the motion by the estate to dismiss the 
insurer’s appeal as untimely because both extension motions were 
filed within 180 days of the orders from which an appeal was 
sought.220 
F. 2001 Amendments and Decision
In 2001, Arkansas courts were still addressing the 
implementation of Amendment 80.221  The amendments to Rule 
4 effective July 1, 2001, made stylistic changes to replace “trial 
court” with “circuit court,” reflecting the passage of Amendment 
215. Id.
216. Id. at 270 n. 1, 984 S.W.2d at 448 n. 1.
217. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Jaynes, 343 Ark. 143, 149, 33 S.W.3d 161, 164 (2000).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 147-49, 33 S.W.3d at 164.
220. Id. at 149, 33 S.W.3d at 164.
221. ARK. CONST. amend. 80.
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80 of the Arkansas Constitution which made the circuit court the 
trial court of original jurisdiction and unified the previous 
division between circuit and chancery courts.222   
In 2001, the Arkansas Court of Civil Appeals also decided 
the case of Oak Hill Manor v. Arkansas Health Services 
Agency.223  There, Oak Hill Manor appealed the decision of the 
Arkansas Health Services Commission permitting Beverly-
Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc. to open a facility on adjacent land.224  
The parties attended a hearing on February 26, 1999, at which the 
circuit court took the appeal under advisement.225  In March 1999, 
the circuit court decided the case and asked Beverly’s counsel to 
prepare a memorandum opinion and precedent order affirming the 
Commission’s decision.226  Beverly’s counsel prepared and 
submitted the documents to the trial judge without providing a 
copy to Oak Hill Manor’s counsel.227  The trial court entered the 
order on March 29, 1999, and neither party was aware that the 
trial court had entered an order.228  In October 1999, counsel for 
Oak Hill Manor learned of the entry of the decree and requested 
a hearing, at which the trial court indicated that it intended to 
vacate the initial order and re-enter a duplicate order to permit the 
parties the opportunity to appeal.229  Oak Hill Manor then 
appealed.230  
Beverly asserted the notice of appeal was not timely filed 
under Rule 4(b)(3) because the 180 day period had expired.231  
Oak Hill Manor responded pointing to the Reporter’s Note to 
Rule 58, which detailed the right of opposing counsel to have an 
opportunity to approve the form of a proposed judgment or 
decree, and to Rule 60(c)(4) which permits the trial court to 
modify an order for misrepresentation or fraud, asserting the 
222. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to July 2001 amendment.
223. Oak Hill Manor, LLC v. Ark. Health Servs. Agency, 72 Ark. App. 458, 37
S.W.3d 681 (2001). 
224. Id. at 459, 37 S.W.3d at 681-2.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 459-60, 37 S.W.3d at 682.
227. Id. at 460, 37 S.W.3d at 682.
228. Oak Hill Manor, 72 Ark. App. at 460, 37 S.W.3d at 682.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 460, 37 S.W.3d at 682.
231. Id. at 460-61, 37 S.W.3d at 682.
750 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:4 
circumstances constitute constructive fraud.232  The Court 
rejected Oak Hill’s argument, relying on federal authorities 
holding specific federal rules addressing the lack of notice 
foreclosed the use of Rule 60 for relief.233  It, therefore, dismissed 
the appeal finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its 
second order, so the notice of appeal was untimely.234 
G. 2003 Amendments and Decisions
In 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted 
Administrative Order Number 2(b) to govern the entry of final 
judgments and orders.235  While Administrative Order Number 2 
had been rewritten in 1999, the text of Rule 4(b)(3) was not 
updated.  The 2003 changes reflected an effort to make Rule 4(d) 
consistent with Administrative Order Number 2.236 
In 2003, Arkansas appellate courts also issued several 
decisions interpreting what is now Rule 4(b)(3).237  The first 
decision by the Court of Appeals is significant because it was the 
impetus for subsequent amendments to Rule 4(b)(3).238  More 
important for our purposes, however, is the decision by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court interpreting Rule 4(b)(3) as containing 
a requirement of reasonable diligence in addition to the other 
requirements necessary to obtain relief.239  In the other unreported 
decisions, the Arkansas Court of Appeals disposed of appeals.240  
First, in February 2003, the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
issued its decision in Barnett v. Monumental General Insurance 
232. Id. at 461-62, 37 S.W.3d at 683 (citing Davis v. Davis, 291 Ark. 473, 725 S.W.2d
845 (1987)). 
233. Oak Hill Manor, 72 Ark. App. at 462-63, 37 S.W.3d at 683-84 (discussing
Zimmer St. Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
234. Id. at 459, 37 S.W.3d at 682.
235. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
236. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 2003 amendment.
237. See, e.g., Arnold v. Camden News Publ’g. Co., 353 Ark. 522, 110 S.W.3d 268
(2003); Barnett v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 81 Ark. App. 23, 24-25, 97 S.W.3d 901, 902 
(2003). 
238. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. at 24-25, 97 S.W.3d at 902, appeal dismissed on other
grounds, 354 Ark. 692, 128 S.W.3d 803 (2003). 
239. Arnold, 353 Ark. at 527-28, 110 S.W.3d at 271-72.
240. Williams v. Blissard Mgmt. & Realty, Inc., 2003 WL 22053063, at *2 (Ark. Ct.
App. Sept. 3, 2003). 
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Co.241  There, in 1996, the trial court held a hearing on a summary 
judgment motion but did not enter the order granting summary 
judgment until May 25, 2000.242  Neither party was aware of entry 
of the order.243  After Barnett discovered the order was entered, 
the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired, so Barnett 
moved to vacate the judgment based on misprision of the clerk.244  
The trial court granted the motion, vacated the judgment, and 
entered a new order granting summary judgment on July 20, 
2001, from which Barnett appealed.245  The Arkansas Court of 
Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal, relying on Oak Hill Manor, 
finding that issues related to the lack of notice were controlled 
solely by Rule 4(b)(3) and Rule 60 was inapplicable, so the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the original order and enter the 
duplicate order.246 
The result and the appropriate rationale, however, divided 
the Arkansas Court of Appeals.  Judge Pittman concurred to say 
the case should be certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court, while 
Judge Bird concurred arguing that Rule 60 permitted relief, just 
not on the facts presented.247  On the other hand, Judge Griffen 
dissented arguing Oak Hill Manor was wrongly decided, and that 
the trial court properly vacated the judgment but erred in granting 
summary judgment.248  Similarly, Judge Roaf also dissented 
joined by Judge Hart,249 stating that while she did not feel Oak 
Hill Manor was wrongfully decided, she would have affirmed on 
cross-appeal, rather than dismissed the appeal.250  Ultimately, 
while the case would lead to further amendments in the text of the 
241. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. at 24-25, 97 S.W.3d at 902.




246. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. at 25, 97 S.W.3d at 902.
247. Id. at 25, 97 S.W.3d at 902 (Pittman, J., concurring); Id. at 27, 97 S.W.3d at 903
(Bird, J., concurring). 
248. Id. at 27, 33-34, 97 S.W.3d at 903-04, 908 (Griffen, J., dissenting).
249. Nota bene, now Associate Justice Hart of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
250. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. at 34, 97 S.W.3d at 908-09 (Roaf, J., dissenting).
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Rule,251 in November 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted 
review and dismissed the appeal on a separate procedural issue.252 
In May 2003, the Arkansas Court of Appeals issued its 
decision in Estate of Coleman v. LTB Land and Timber Co.,253 
and dismissed an appeal as lacking jurisdiction based on the 
appellants’ failure to file an effective notice of appeal.254  There, 
the Court of Appeals noted that the appellants argued that neither 
they nor their counsel were notified of the entry of the final order, 
and thus they were denied due process.255  In dismissing the 
appeal, the court stated “[w]hile we recognize the problem, our 
rules of civil procedure do not currently address this issue.”256  So, 
this opinion confirms that the proper procedure is to seek to 
extend the period for filing a notice of appeal in the circuit court, 
rather than asserting an argument to that effect on appeal. 
More significantly, in June 2003, in Arnold v. Camden News 
Publishing Co., the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its seminal 
decision requiring “diligence” as a condition to obtaining an 
extension of time to file a belated notice of appeal.257  There, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of 
a motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal.258  In the 
underlying suit, all parties had filed summary judgment motions 
at the close of discovery.259  After a hearing on the motions, the 
chancery court issued a letter stating it intended to grant summary 
judgment to the Camden News Publishing Co., deny Arnold’s 
motion for partial summary judgment, and asked Camden’s 
counsel to prepare the precedent and provide Arnold’s counsel 
five days to review the precedent and provide comments.260  On 
251. See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
252. Barnett v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 354 Ark. 692, 695, 128 S.W.3d 803, 805
(dismissing for failure to provide adequate record after noting absence of order). 
253. Coleman v. LTB Land & Timber Co., 2003 WL 21227355 (Ark. Ct. App. May
28, 2003). 
254. Id. at *1.
255. Id.
256. Id. (noting “problems relating to lack of notice that an order has been filed are
controlled entirely by Rule 4(b)(3) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil and that Rule 
60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure is simply inapplicable.”).  
257. See Arnold v. Camden News Publ’g. Co., 353 Ark. 522, 110 S.W.3d 268 (2003).
258. Id. at 524, 110 S.W.3d at 269.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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November 13, 2000, Camden’s counsel faxed the precedent to the 
court and Arnold’s counsel, who responded on November 20, 
2000, reserving the right to appeal the findings and conclusions 
but informing the chancery court that counsel had no comments 
on the precedent.261  The decree was signed by the circuit judge 
on November 22, 2000, but was not entered until five days later, 
November 27, 2000.262  Arnold’s counsel did not learn of the 
entry of the decree until January 26, 2001, when he inquired of 
the clerk regarding the status of the decree.263  He asserted that 
neither he nor Arnold’s Washington D.C. attorney received a 
copy of the decree nor were they aware of the entry of the 
decree.264 
Eight days after learning of the entry of the decree, and 
seventy-three days after the entry of the decree, on February 8, 
2001, Arnold moved to extend the time to file a notice of appeal 
under Rule 4(b)(3), asserting no prejudice would result from the 
extension, the motion was timely filed, and providing affidavits 
from both Arnold and her attorney that they had not received the 
decree, they had thought the trial court would notify them upon 
entry of the decree, and they simply thought the court was taking 
time to consider the precedent.265  The trial court denied the 
motion because it was filed more than thirty days after the entry 
of the ruling from which appeal was sought, and granting the 
extension would violate the integrity of the rule.266  The trial court 
also found that “[t]he burden of diligence is on all parties to stay 
informed about the status of a case as a matter of Arkansas case 
law.”267  The trial court concluded that Arnold was aware, as of 
November 20, 2000, that entry of the decree could occur at any 
time but failed to exercise reasonable diligence by monitoring the 
docket afterward.268 
On appeal, Arnold asserted that the chancery “court erred 
[by] engrafting a due diligence requirement onto Rule 4(b)(3) . . . 
261. Id.
262. Arnold, 353 Ark. at 524, 110 S.W.3d at 269.




267. Arnold, 353 Ark. at 525, 110 S.W.3d at 270 (internal quotations omitted).
268. Id.
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to foreclose the granting of a motion to extend the time for filing 
a notice of appeal where” all the rule’s conditions were 
satisfied.269  She asserted that the trial court was required to have 
granted her motion once she showed she did not receive notice of 
the order and her motion was timely, in other words, “filed within 
180 days of [the] entry of the order.”270  The Arkansas Supreme 
Court disagreed.271  It stated that Arnold should “have been aware 
that the order could then be entered at any time.”272  After 
observing the diligence standard required of attorneys under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3, the Court rejected 
the notion that the trial judge was attempting to engraft a new 
diligence standard onto the rule and held that the trial court 
instead applied an interpretation of Rule 4 made by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, but which had become part of the rule.273  The 
Court then observed that Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure permitted an extension of time “regardless 
of diligence” but rejected the notion that the 1999 amendment to 
Rule 4 was intended to make them consistent because, under the 
federal rule, the clerk is required to send entered precedents to 
counsel of record—the obligation of which does not exist under 
Arkansas law.274  Instead, the Court noted that the duty to remain 
informed of the status of cases lies with the parties, “particularly 
when . . . counsel . . . [is] aware that the order could be entered by 
the court at any time.” 275  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the 
denial of Arnold’s motion to extend time to file notice of 
appeal.276   
Finally, a few months later, in September 2003, the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals applied the diligence standard in an unreported 
269. Id.
270. Id. at 527, 110 S.W.3d at 271.
271. Id.
272. Arnold, 353 Ark. at 527, 110 S.W.3d at 271.
273. Id. at 528, 110 S.W.3d at 272 (citing Chickasaw Chem. Co. v. Beasley, 328 Ark.
472, 944 S.W.2d 511 (1997)).  Interestingly, the Arnold court relies on Chickasaw Chem. 
Co., as support for the proposition “that a lawyer and litigant must exercise reasonable 
diligence in keeping up with the docket.”  Id.  Nothing in the Chickasaw Chemical Co. 
opinion, however, specifically raises or addresses this point.  See generally Chickasaw Chem. 
Co., 328 Ark. at 472, 944 S.W.2d at 511. 
274. Arnold, 353 Ark. at 528, 110 S.W.3d at 272.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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decision to uphold the circuit court’s rejection of a motion for 
belated appeal.  There, the proposed order entered was drafted by 
the appellants counsel, approved by appellee’s counsel, and the 
parties were aware of its submission to the circuit court. 277  As a 
result, the Court of Appeals discussed Arnold and found the 
appellants “were obligated to exercise some modicum of 
diligence in determining the ongoing status of the case,” so the 
circuit court did not err in denying the appellants’ motion for 
belated appeal.278   
H. 2004 Amendments and Decisions
In 2004, apparently motivated by the two decisions 
interpreting Rule 4(b)(3) issued in 2003, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court adopted two small, but significant changes to Rule 4(b)(3).  
First, the Court replaced the word “may” with “shall.”279  In doing 
so, an extension by the circuit court under Rule 4(b)(3) became 
mandatory—effectively changing the rule to avoid the conclusion 
reached by the Arnold Court that, if the other requirements of 
Rule 4(b)(3) were met, granting the extension of time to file a 
notice of appeal was discretionary with the trial court.280  Second, 
the Court added a third sentence to Rule 4(b)(3) to make clear 
that, while “an extension of time is no longer possible because 
more than 180 days have passed, the circuit court retains its 
authority to take action under” Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of 
Civil Procedure.281  This language changed the text of Rule 
4(b)(3) to effectively avoid the conclusion the Court reached in 
Barnett.282  Accordingly, the ultimate impact of the 2004 
amendments was to essentially change the rule to abrogate two 
2003 decisions interpreting Rule 4(b)(3).  
On December 22, 2004, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
decided the case of Arkco Corp. v. Askew.283  There, the Court 
277. Williams v. Blissard Mgmt. & Realty, Inc., 2003 WL 22053063, at *2 (Ark. Ct.
App. Sept. 3, 2003). 
278. Id.




283. Arkco Corp. v. Askew, 360 Ark. 222, 200 S.W.3d 444 (2004).
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reaffirmed the diligence requirement—noting that the 
amendments to Rule 4(b)(3) did not remove the requirement of 
reasonable diligence, which was considered part of the rule.284  
Although the facts of the Arkco decision are somewhat laborious, 
the case merits a brief review.   
Arkco Corp. filed suit against its former counsel, Askew, 
asserting legal malpractice for failing to timely perfect an 
appeal.285  Askew had represented Arkco in a lawsuit filed against 
W.T. Paine in Phillips County Chancery Court.286  In mid-
December 1996, the trial court announced that it intended to rule 
against Arkco, but before judgment was filed, Arkco filed a 
petition in bankruptcy court on December 24, 1996.287  At 8:15 
a.m. on December 31, 1996, a notice of removal to bankruptcy
court was filed in the state court case, approximately three hours
before the state court entered a judgment at 11:15 a.m.288  On
January 15, 1997, Askew filed “protective” post-trial motions in
the state court noting that the judgment was invalid because of the
removal to bankruptcy court, but they were filed to “protect the
record.”289
On March 12, 1997, Askew timely filed a notice of appeal 
from the December 31, 1996 order, making the appellate record 
due on June 10, 1997.290  In March 1996, the Arkco bankruptcy 
case was dismissed, although the bankruptcy court did not 
immediately remand the case to state court.291  For reasons the 
opinion did not disclose, on June 6, 1997, the eighty-sixth day 
after filing the notice of appeal, Askew filed a motion to extend 
the time to lodge the record on appeal.292  The circuit court signed 
an order extending the time on June 9, 1997, but the order was not 
entered until June 12, 1997, two days after the deadline for filing 
the record.293  Accordingly, on September 12, 1997, the Arkansas 
284. Id. at 228, 200 S.W.3d at 449.
285. Id. at 224, 200 S.W.3d at 446.
286. Id. at 223, 200 S.W.3d at 445.
287. Id. at 223-24, 200 S.W.3d at 445.




292. Id. at 224, 200 S.W.3d at 446.
293. Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 224, 200 S.W.3d at 446.
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Supreme Court Clerk rejected the tender of the record as 
untimely.294   
The following month, on October 3, 1997, the bankruptcy 
court entered its order remanding the case to “state court effective 
from the date of the earliest decree of the state court” and “nunc 
pro tunc [to] December 30, 1996.”295  Apparently, the bankruptcy 
court intended to remand the case to circuit court and validate the 
state court judgment entered after the removal of the case to the 
bankruptcy court.296  
On May 20, 2002, Arkco filed suit against Askew asserting 
that he failed to timely appeal the case and, as a result, Arkco had 
lost its right to appeal.297  Askew sought summary judgment on 
Arkco’s claims asserting that any failure to appeal the order was 
immaterial because the judgment, having been entered after 
removal of the case to bankruptcy court, was void.298  At a 
December 12, 2003, hearing, the circuit court granted Askew 
partial summary judgment on Arkco’s claim, and advised the 
parties that the court would be in recess for the holidays from 
December 19, 2003, until January 5, 2004.299   
After the hearing, on December 16, 2003, Arkco’s new 
attorney requested the proposed order granting partial summary 
judgment be revised to include a Rule 54(b) certificate, so his 
client could pursue an interlocutory appeal.300  The attorneys 
submitted the precedent to the circuit court on December 18, 
2003.301  The order was filed December 19, 2003.302 Arkco failed 
to timely appeal from the final order, and sought relief under Rule 
4(b)(3) on January 26, 2004, which the circuit court granted, over 
Askew’s objection.303 
On appeal, Askew contended that if Arkco was unaware of 
the filing of the order, that ignorance resulted from Arkco’s 
294. Id.
295. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 224-25, 200 S.W.3d at 446.




303. See Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 225-27, 200 S.W.3d 446-47.
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failure to monitor the status of the case, given that it knew the 
order had been signed by the judge before December 19, 2003.304  
Even if Arkco believed, as it suggested, that the order would not 
be entered until January 5, 2004, Askew argued its failure to 
check on the docket until January 26, 2004, was not diligence.305  
Askew therefore, asked that Arkco’s appeal be dismissed, 
because the reasonable diligence requirement of Rule 4(b)(3) was 
not satisfied.   
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with Askew.306  The 
Court observed that it had “consistently interpreted” Rule 4(b)(3) 
as containing a diligence requirement, and its interpretation 
subsequently became part of the Rule.307  It then noted that the 
2004 amendments to Rule 4(b)(3) did not remove the diligence 
requirement placed on attorneys, but instead, changed only the 
trial judge’s duty by making an extension mandatory where the 
trial court found an attorney acted diligently, but did not receive 
notice of a final order.308  The court observed that Arkco’s counsel 
failed to exercise due diligence in keeping up with the court’s 
docket to determine whether the December 19, 2003 order was 
entered.309  Had he followed up on the entry of the order and 
shown that he met the other requirements of Rule 4(b)(3), the 
Court noted that the trial court would have had an absolute duty 
to grant his motion for extension.310  Arkco’s new counsel, 
however, offered no proof he had acted diligently, so the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held the trial court erred by granting 
Arkco’s Rule 4(b)(3) motion.311  Because its notice of appeal was 
untimely, and an untimely notice of appeal deprives the appellate 
courts of jurisdiction, the Court dismissed Arkco’s appeal.312 
304. Id. at 226, 200 S.W.3d at 447.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 228, 200 S.W.3d at 448.
307. Id.
308. Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 228, 200 S.W.3d at 448-49.
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I. 2006 Amendments
In 2006, the Court amended Rule 4(b)(3) to expressly 
incorporate the diligence requirement as part of the conditions to 
be satisfied by a party seeking to reopen the time to file a notice 
of appeal.313  The 2006 amendment essentially conformed the text 
of Rule 4(b)(3) to the Court’s holding in Arnold and Arkco Corp. 
by making the diligence requirement under the Court’s decisions 
unambiguously part of the text of Rule 4(b)(3).314  So, in addition 
to satisfying the Rule’s other conditions, a party seeking to reopen 
the time to file a notice of appeal must demonstrate diligence 
itself, or by his or her counsel, in attempting to find out if the 
circuit court had entered the judgment, decree, or order from 
which appeal is sought.315   
J. Decisions Between 2005 and 2010
In the period after the 2006 amendments, the Arkansas 
appellate courts rejected several requests for relief under Rule 
4(b)(3), but upheld two extensions.316  These opinions establish 
some consistency in the treatment of requests for relief under Rule 
4(b)(3) because each opinion denying relief turned on the 
question of diligence.   
In Moody, an unpublished decision, the Arkansas Court of 
Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion for belated appeal.317  
After an appeal was dismissed because the summary judgment 
order disposed of only one claim, William Waddell, counsel for 
three defendants Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 
Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. and Farm Bureau 
313. See ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 4 addition to reporter’s note to 2006 amendment.
314. Id.
315. Arkco Corp., 360 Ark. at 229, 200 S.W.3d at 449.
316. See Tissing v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. 166, at 8, 303 S.W.3d 446,
448 (denying relief under Rule 4(b)(3)); Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 285, 
295, 265 S.W.3d 117, 124 (2007) (same); Sloan v. Ark. Rural Med. Practice Loan & 
Scholarship Bd., 369 Ark. 442, 445, 255 S.W.3d 834, 837 (2007) (same); Moody v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 2006 WL 557102, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2006) (same). 
But see Kidwell v. Rhew, 371 Ark. 490, 491 n.1, 268 S.W.3d 309, 310 n.1 (2007) (allowing 
relief under Rule 4(b)(3)); Anderson v. Holada, 2010 Ark. App. 143, at 2-3, opinion after 
rebriefing 2010 Ark. App. 425 (same).   
317. Moody, 2006 WL 557102, at *3.
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Mutual Insurance Co. submitted to the circuit court a proposed 
order on the summary judgment motions to dispose of all claims 
as against his clients on December 16, 2004.318  Brooks Gill, the 
plaintiff’s attorney, responded by objecting to the form of order, 
and asking for permission to file an amended response to the 
summary judgment motion.319  On February 21, 2005, Richard 
Watts, counsel for the remaining defendants Arkansas Farm 
Bureau Federation, Inc. and Sebastian County Farm Bureau, Inc., 
submitted to the circuit court a proposed order disposing of all 
claims against his clients.320  Mr. Gill again objected to the form 
of order, and asked for permission to file an amended response to 
the summary judgment motion.321  On February 28, 2005, the 
circuit court entered both orders.322  Plaintiff then sought to 
extend the time to file a notice of appeal.323   
At the hearing on his motion, Mr. Gill testified that he 
received no email, fax, or mail notifying him the orders were 
entered, and the first suggestion he received was an April 6, 2005 
e-mail from Mr. Waddell asking if plaintiff had elected not to
appeal the orders.324  He could not reach Mr. Waddell but spoke
to Mr. Watts by telephone and Mr. Watts had confirmed entry of
the orders and faxed him a copy of the order and an email from
Mr. Waddell, dated February 28, 2005, that advised an order of
summary judgment was entered as to his clients and he assumed
as to Mr. Watt’s clients, too.325  Mr. Gill testified that he did not
receive Mr. Waddell’s February 28, 2005 e-mail message, and he
had asked his secretary to check the clerk’s office twice in January
2005 to see if any order was entered.326  His secretary also
testified that she checked e-mails daily or at least every other day
and she did not locate any e-mails from Messrs. Watts or Waddell
in February or March 2005, that she had received complaints of
unreceived e-mail in the period of time, and that the firm’s








326. Id. at *2.
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internet service provider had installed a spam blocker to intercept 
junk e-mails and delete them after several days so she could not 
say whether any e-mails by Messrs. Watts or Waddell were 
intercepted because she was infrequently monitoring the spam 
blocker.327  Finally, Mr. Gills’ spouse and law partner testified her 
husband expected a response regarding his request to file 
supplemental responses and, while the firm commonly sent and 
received documents by e-mail, she was not aware of any mail 
from the court or clerk.328  Mr. Watts testified he had sent an e-
mail to Messrs. Gill and Waddell on March 1, 2005, advising of 
his receipt of a signed order related to his clients the day before, 
and that e-mail contained Mr. Waddell’s prior February 28th e-
mail.329  The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied the motion 
without comment.330  
On appeal, plaintiff contended the circuit court erred by 
denying the motion for belated appeal.331  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, noting that while the record showed transmittal of the 
e-mails giving notice of the entry of the orders, even if it could
not say plaintiff’s counsel received either e-mail, it could not say
the denial was in error because the attorney failed to act diligently
in keeping up with the status of the case since, despite being aware
of the submission of the orders to the circuit court as of February
21, 2005, counsel had neglected to ascertain if the orders were
entered for over a month.332
Similarly, in Tissing, the Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed 
the appeal filed by Sandy Tissing, the administratrix of an estate, 
who had sought to discharge a DHS lien against a probate 
estate.333  After DHS refused Tissing’s request at the agency level, 
Tissing filed only a notice of appeal, and not a petition, with the 
circuit court.334  Because Tissing failed to serve a petition and 





332. Moody, 2006 WL 557102, at *3.
333. Tissing v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. 166, at 1-2, 303 S.W.3d 446,
446-47.
334. Id. at 2, 303 S.W.3d at 447.
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summons, DHS sought dismissal for improper service.335  Tissing 
sought summary judgment arguing that service of her notice of 
appeal was sufficient and that DHS had failed to timely file the 
administrative record.336  On March 7, 2007, the circuit court 
heard the parties’ motions, but took them under advisement to 
consider the parties’ briefs and arguments.337  On August 31, 
2007, the circuit court entered a letter opinion stating it was 
granting DHS’s motion to dismiss.338  It then entered a formal 
order of dismissal on February 21, 2008.339  
Unaware of the February 21 order, Tissing obtained entry of 
a second order of dismissal on April 1, 2008.340  Tissing then filed 
a notice of appeal on April 28, 2008, served it on DHS, and asked 
that DHS look through its records for the original order.341  On 
May 5, 2008, DHS then sent the February 21 order to the clerk 
and asked that the order be filed.342  The clerk filed the order 
(again) on May 6, 2008.343   
Tissing then filed a motion for relief under Rule 4(b)(3) 
asserting that the clerk had not provided a copy of the February 
21 order, and that the May 6 filing rendered her notice of appeal 
untimely.344  After holding a telephone conference, the trial court 
granted her motion finding no prejudice to DHS and the facts in 
her motion to be true.345  
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the entry 
of the extension order was an abuse of discretion because the 
attorney was not diligent.346  The Court based its conclusion on 
four facts: first, Tissing’s attorney saw the order that was prepared 
in the trial court’s office on September 14, 2007; second, he 
ordered the March 7, 2007 hearing transcript on September 25, 
2007; third, he sent DHS a letter dated January 23, 2008, that 
335. Id. at 3, 303 S.W.3d at 447.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Tissing, 2009 Ark. 166 at 3-4, 303 S.W.3d at 448.
339. Id. at 4, 303 S.W.3d at 448.
340. Id., 303 S.W.3d at 448.
341. Id., 303 S.W.3d at 448.
342. Id.
343. Tissing, 2009 Ark. 166 at 4, 303 S.W.3d at 448.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 5 n.2, 303 S.W.3d at 448.
346. Id. at 5-6, 303 S.W.3d at 448.
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recited he had seen the signed order, but it had never been filed; 
and finally, he waited until March 31, 2008 to ask the circuit court 
to sign the order which was filed April 1, 2008.347  Based on these 
facts, the Court held the attorney failed to monitor the status of 
the case and did not act diligently.348  It, therefore, reversed the 
trial court.349 
In Sloan, two doctors who had accepted medical school 
scholarships in exchange for an agreement to practice medicine 
in Corning, Arkansas upon graduation350 sought a declaratory 
judgment and judicial review by the circuit court of a decision by 
the President of the University of Arkansas to affirm the Arkansas 
Rural Medical Practice Loan & Scholarship Board’s finding that 
the doctors had failed to comply with their agreement.351  In an 
order dated June 23, 2006, the circuit court held that no appellate 
review of the President’s decision was available under either the 
Rural Practice Act or the Arkansas Administrative Procedures 
Act, and denied their appeal and complaint for declaratory 
judgment.352 
On September 29, 2006, the doctors filed their notice of 
appeal.353  They also filed a Rule 4(b)(3) motion seeking an 
extension of time to file a notice of appeal, asserting the Circuit 
Clerk failed to serve a copy of the June 23 order on the Sloans or 
their attorneys until September 7, 2006.354  The circuit court 
granted their motion for an extension of time without a hearing, 
so their allegation was the only “evidence” in the record to 
support their request.355  While the Sloans had submitted an 
347. Id. at 8, 303 S.W.3d at 449.
348. Tissing, 2009 Ark. 166 at 8, 303 S.W.3d at 449.
349. Id.
350. Common in the 1990s, this arrangement was designed to help rural areas attract
doctors—by agreeing to subsidize a doctor’s education, the municipality, usually a rural and 
underserved area, would obtain the services of a local doctor, but the students participating 
in the program received certain preferences in admissions criteria.  See, e.g., Northern 
Exposure (CBS) (portraying a recently graduated physician who is sent to a rural town in 
Alaska to repay the debt he incurred while in medical school). 
351. Sloan v. Ark. Rural Med. Prac. Loan & Scholarship Bd., 369 Ark. 442, 443, 255
S.W.3d 834, 836 (2007). 
352. Id. at 443-44, 255 S.W.3d at 836.
353. Id. at 444, 255 S.W.3d at 836.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 444-45, 255 S.W.3d at 836-37.
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affidavit to the appellate court detailing their actions in checking 
the circuit court’s docket, the affidavit was not presented to the 
circuit court, so it could not be considered on appeal.356  Quoting 
from Arkco Corp., the Court held that the Sloans had not shown 
diligence because parties had some obligation to keep up with the 
status of their case.357  The Court observed that there was a lack 
of evidence from which to find diligence and, therefore, found the 
Sloans’ appeal untimely.358   
In Francis, the Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed an appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction in a case involving a fax filing.359  There, 
the judgment containing a handwritten rate of six percent was 
faxed to the clerk on November 3, 2005, and filed, but a hard copy 
of the judgment with a rate of ten percent was entered on 
November 10, 2005 with the handwritten note “Replaces fax filed 
11-3-05.”360  Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on December 9,
2005, but the Court held it was untimely as, under Administrative
Order Number 2, the fax-filed order controlled the appellate
deadlines, and she could not show prejudice because the correct
interest rate was ten percent.361  To show prejudice from the
change, plaintiff asserted that the notice of appeal was late
because the court failed to keep counsel informed about the filings
in the case, and through no fault of plaintiff as her counsel had no
way of knowing about the November 3 judgment because he did
not receive it, and the copies of the November 10 judgment he
received did not include the handwritten note.362  Citing Arkco
Corp., the Court rejected this argument noting that if plaintiff and
her counsel had exercised reasonable diligence, they would have
known of the November 3 judgment and the note on the
November 10 judgment.363
356. Sloan, 369 Ark. at 445 n.3, 255 S.W.3d at 837 n.3.
357. Id. at 444-45, 255 S.W.3d at 836-37.
358. Id. at 444-46, 255 S.W.3d at 836-38.  The Sloan decision also placed the
timeliness of filing a notice of appeal above finality and appealability.  See, e.g., Flow v. 
Turner, 2015 Ark. App. 413, at 4. 
359. Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 285, 288, 265 S.W.3d 117, 119
(2007). 
360. Id. at 290, 265 S.W.3d at 121.
361. Id. at 290, 292, 294, 265 S.W.3d at 121-22, 124.
362. Id. at 294-95, 265 S.W.3d at 124.
363. Id. at 295, 265 S.W.3d at 124.
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In 2007, the Arkansas Supreme Court also decided Kidwell 
v. Rhew,364 one of the few reported decisions permitting relief
under Rule 4(b)(3).  Unfortunately, the opinion only discusses the
extension of time in a footnote.365  There, the circuit court entered
an order on March 13, 2007, rejecting the argument by Renda
Kidwell to determine whether Arkansas’ pretermitted-heir statute
applied to a revocable inter vivos trust, where the decedent settlor
had failed to execute a will and died intestate.366  On May 28,
2007, Kidwell sought an extension of time to file a notice of
appeal under Rule 4(b)(3).367  “In that motion, she alleged that,
despite repeated phone calls to the White County Clerk’s office,
she was never notified that the circuit court’s order had been
entered; she did not receive word that the order had been filed
until May 16, 2007.”368  On May 25, 2007, the circuit court
granted her motion finding that neither Kidwell nor her attorney
had received notice of the signing or entry of the court’s order,
that less than 180 days had elapsed, and no party would be
prejudiced by the extension.369  Kidwell filed her notice of appeal
on May 31, 2007, and the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the
appeal, mentioning the extension only in a footnote after
observing that “Kidwell filed a timely notice of appeal.”370
In a 2008 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that, 
even where a court has failed to observe a mandatory obligation 
set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney is not 
relieved of his duty to act diligently.371  In Watson v. Connors, on 
March 3, 2005, the trial court dismissed the case for failure to 
prosecute without the mandatory notice to the parties required by 
Rule 41(a) of the Arkansas Rule Civil Procedure.372  After 
learning of the dismissal after seeking a trial setting, on 
364. Kidwell v. Rhew, 371 Ark. 490, 268 S.W.3d 309 (2007).
365. Id. at 491 n.1, 268 S.W.3d at 310 n.1.
366. Id. at 491, 268 S.W.3d at 310.
367. Id. at 491 n.1, 268 S.W.3d at 310 n.1.
368. Id.
369. Kidwell, 371 Ark at 491 n.1, 268 S.W.3d at 310 n.1.
370. Id. at 491, 268 S.W.3d at 310.
371. Watson v. Connors, 372 Ark. 56, 61-62, 270 S.W.3d 826, 830 (2008) (finding
lack of diligence based on attorney’s inaction, despite circuit court’s failure to observe Rule 
41(b)’s mandatory notice requirement).  
372. Id. at 57, 270 S.W.3d at 827.
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November 6, 2006, plaintiff sought to vacate the order of 
dismissal under Rule 60(b) of the Arkansas Rule Civil Procedure 
as a clerical error that could be corrected at any time.373  The 
Court rejected this argument, finding that an order entered by the 
trial court in error was not a clerical error subject to correction 
after the expiration of ninety days.374  Citing Arkco Corp., it also 
rejected plaintiff’s argument that the failure to notify the plaintiff 
of the dismissal order took away any opportunity to contest its 
entry until he learned of the dismissal, noting that even rules 
mandating the trial court to act did not relieve the attorney of his 
obligation to act diligently and noting that after filing the 
complaint, the plaintiff and his attorney failed to contact the court 
for over three years, and were not diligent.375   
Finally, in 2010, in Anderson v. Holada, the Arkansas Court 
of Appeals issued two opinions.376  The first opinion noted that 
the order extending the time to file a notice of appeal was missing 
from the appendix submitted by the appellant, and ordered re-
briefing.377  Afterwards, apparently neither the appellate court nor 
the parties raised the issue of diligence. 378  Like Kidwell, the 
Anderson opinion represents one of the rare opinions where an 
Arkansas appellate court upheld relief under Rule 4(b)(3).   
K. 2012 Amendments
In 2012, amendments to Rules 2(b) and 3(a) of the Arkansas 
Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil made clear that Rules 2(b) 
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 61-62, 270 S.W.3d at 830.
376. Anderson v. Holada, 2010 Ark. App. 143 opinion after rebriefing 2010 Ark. App.
426. 
377. Anderson, 2010 Ark. App. 143, at 2-3.
378. See Anderson, 2010 Ark. App. 426.  Indeed, the docket confirms the appellees did
not seek to dismiss the appeal, as the only motion to dismiss was a motion to dismiss the 
prior request for oral argument.  The docket for the appeal is available on the worldwide web 
at https://perma.cc/R59Q-KNYW.  Upon rebriefing, the appellate court did not raise the 
issue of jurisdiction but, instead, decided the appeal on its merits.  Anderson, 2010 Ark. App. 
426, at 1; but see River Valley Homes, Inc. v. Freeland-Kauffman & Fredeen, Inc., 2010 
Ark. App. 682, at 5-6 (“Although Sloan, Arkco Corp., and Arnold each involved an 
appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal and there has not been a motion to dismiss the present 
appeal, this is a matter that goes to our jurisdiction and must be raised by this court if not 
raised by the parties.”).  
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and 3(a) were intended to limit the post-judgment motions that 
permit appellate review of either the original judgment or 
intermediate orders to the post-judgment motions listed in Rule 
4(b)(1), and to exclude motions under Rule 4(b)(3).379  Until that 
amendment, Rules 2(b) and 3(a) contained identical language 
stating, “[a]n appeal from an order disposing of a postjudgment 
motion under Rule 4 brings up for review the judgment and any 
intermediate order involving the merits and necessarily affecting 
the judgment, as well as the order appealed from.”380  
Accordingly, a logical reading of Rules 2(b) and 3(a) suggested 
the denial of any post-judgment motion under Rule 4(b)(3) would 
bring up for appellate review either the original judgment or an 
intermediate order.381  Because Rule 4(b)(3) permits motions to 
be filed within 180 days of the entry of the order from which an 
appeal is sought, courts might have read this language as creating 
a 180-day appellate period for the original judgment or an 
intermediate order.382  The 2012 amendment, therefore, resolved 
this ambiguity in Rules 2(b) and 3(a) by specifically limiting 
appellate review of the original judgment or intermediate orders 
to only those post-judgment motions listed in Rule 4(b)(1).383   
L. 2014 Amendments and After
Although there were several subsequent amendments in 
2014, none were related to subparagraph (b)(3), so we need not 
discuss them.384   
In 2016, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the request for 
a belated appeal by Carl Davis, Jr., a prisoner who had filed a 
petition seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the calculation 
of his parole eligibility date, but who did not receive notice of the 
trial court’s April 17, 2015 order denying his petition until 
September 2, 2015, when the clerk responded to his August 31, 
379. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 2 addition to reporter’s notes to 2012 amendment.
380. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 2 addition to reporter’s notes to 2012 amendment (internal
quotations omitted); See ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 2(b), 3(a) for amended rules. 
381. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 2 addition to reporter’s notes to 2012 amendment.
382. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 2 addition to reporter’s notes to 2012 amendment.
383. ARK. R. APP. P. CIV. 2 addition to reporter’s notes to 2012 amendment.
384. See In re Amendments to Rules of Civ. Procedure, 2014 Ark. 119.
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2015 motion requesting a status update. 385  The Court noted that 
this lack of notice occurred despite the mandatory requirement of 
Rule 37.3(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
requires the circuit court to provide prompt notice to the petitioner 
of an order entered on a Rule 37.1 petition.386  Although noting 
that he had filed his notice of appeal within 149 days of the April 
17, 2015 order, the Court took issue with the fact that Davis failed 
to timely file a motion seeking an extension of time under Rule 
4(b)(3), or to show cause for why he did not seek the extension.387  
The Court had no sympathy for his pro se status, noting that both 
lawyers and litigants have to “exercise reasonable diligence to 
keep up with the status of their cases, and pro se litigants are held 
to the same standard as licensed attorneys.”388  The Court 
dismissed the case, finding that had Davis been diligent in 
checking on the status of his case or otherwise met Rule 4(b)(3)’s 
requirements, a mandatory extension was available, but Davis had 
neither “provided an excuse for his failure to file a timely notice 
of appeal that would constitute good cause for the omission,” nor 
had he shown compliance with the procedural rules.389   
V. CONCLUSION
While Rule 4(b)(3) has traversed a great distance from its 
omission from the initial Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1979, 
room for growth remains.  The Rule was adopted initially to 
remedy the perceived injustice of a party having lost its appeal 
rights because that party did not receive an order or judgment.  
Yet, few decisions have upheld relief under Rule 4(b)(3).  
Recently, the requirement that a litigant demonstrate diligence 
has in practice become the death knell for requests for relief under 
Rule 4(b)(3).  The Arkansas Supreme Court created the diligence 
requirement, then added it to the text of the Rule.  Since adopting 
the requirement, Arkansas appellate courts have been content to 
385. Davis v. State, 2016 Ark. 47, at 1-2, 481 S.W.3d 764, 765-66.
386. Id. at 3, 481 S.W.3d at 766.
387. Id. at 3, 481 S.W.3d at 766.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 4, 481 S.W.3d at 766-67.  Accord McClain v. Norris, 2009 Ark. 428, at 1-2
(denying motion for belated appeal in similar circumstances). 
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administer Rule 4(b)(3) on an ad hoc basis, reviewing decisions 
of circuit courts to ascertain whether the litigants or their counsel 
acted with diligence.   
The reality of the current legal practice, where Arkansas 
attorneys routinely handle actions across the state, suggests that 
the notion of a practitioner stopping by the courthouse daily to 
review the status of all of his or her cases is outmoded and 
impractical.  While the spread of electronic filing may help this 
matter by making dockets readily available and making it easier 
to ascertain whether an order was entered, it is not a consistent 
cure.390  The reported decisions establish a failure to monitor the 
status of a case following the submission of an order on a 
dispositive motion or on the merits is difficult to overcome.391   
One reading of these decisions remains troubling because it 
consists of entirely circular logic: a party is not entitled to relief 
merely because, had it been diligent, that party would have known 
of the entry of the judgment, decree, or order from which it now 
seeks a belated appeal.392  Litigants use the reported decisions to 
argue against motions for belated appeals on this basis.393  Were 
that the appropriate inquiry, then Rule 4(b)(3) would be merely 
illusory and not a viable remedy for the most common 
circumstances in which an order is entered without notice to a 
party or attorney.  A better reading of the cases on diligence 
appears to be that the duty to monitor the case exists, but firmly 
attaches when the case is finally submitted and the parties have 
actual notice of the submission of proposed orders to resolve the 
action, or awareness of some reason to be monitoring the docket.  
This obligation, however, should be finite.  Where the court does 
390. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing cases presenting similar
issues in the federal system despite federal courts having fully embraced electronic filing). 
391. See, e.g., Sloan v. Ark. Rural Med. Practice Loan & Scholarship Bd., 369 Ark.
442, 444-45, 255 S.W.3d 834, 836-37 (2007). 
392. See, e.g., id. at 445 n.3, 255 S.W.3d at 837 (“Even if this court could consider
these affidavits, it raises the question of why, if the two affiants were closely monitoring the 
progress of this case and its appeal, did the Sloans fail to discover when it was filed and wait 
almost three months to request an extension for their appeal?”). 
393. See, e.g., Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal,
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Smith, No. 72CV-12-1822 (Cir. Ct. Wash. Cty. Mar. 24, 
2014); Brief in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal at 3-
4, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Smith, No. 72CV-12-1822 (Cir. Ct. Wash. Cty. Mar. 24, 
2014).   
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not promptly enter an order after its submission, there should be 
a time when it is reasonable for the parties to believe that the court 
does not intend to use a proposed order submitted in the case.  
This reading gives effect to the diligence requirement but 
balances it against Rule 4(b)(3), which must exist to provide 
relief, even if in limited factual circumstances.   
Whatever view was intended, in addressing requests under 
Rule 4(b)(3) Arkansas appellate courts could offer litigants and 
the bar more meaningful analysis regarding what is necessary to 
show diligence, rather than merely an ad hoc conclusion as to 
whether the episodic conduct rises to the level of diligence.   
While the construction of what Rule 4(b)(3) intended is an 
opportunity for the courts to determine policy, the issue might be 
better addressed by changes to Arkansas law or procedural rules 
to place the responsibility for the service of final orders on 
someone.  This approach would address the root cause and make 
Arkansas’s practice more consistent with the practices of other 
states and federal courts.394  For example, by amending section 
16-20-304 of the Arkansas Code, the legislature could direct the
circuit clerk or a deputy to serve copies of all orders in a civil case
from which an appeal might lie on all parties that have appeared
in an action.  Another approach might be the adoption of a court
rule requiring the circuit clerk or the parties to serve copies of
such orders.395  Such a requirement would hopefully remove the
underlying root cause for most of the cases involving requests for
belated appeals by better ensuring that litigants actually receive
the intended notice.
Absent action by the court or legislature, it seems unlikely 
that Rule 4(b)(3) or its application by Arkansas courts will change 
significantly.  Accordingly, litigants and the bar will be left to 
examine the facts of each case to ascertain whether they can 
marshal enough evidence of diligence to have any hope of 
obtaining relief. 
394. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
395. Adoption of such a requirement by rule might avoid any argument that such an
amendment constitutes a rule of “pleading, practice, and procedure,” and therefore is 
constitutionally suspect under Arkansas’ separation of powers doctrine.  See generally 
Austin A. King, A Problematic Procedure: The Struggle for Control of Procedural 
Rulemaking Power, 67 ARK. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (2014). 
